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REASONING: THE LAW AND STRATEGY OF 
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TAAVI ANNUS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The relevance of comparative law in constitutional adjudication 
has repeatedly been at the center of heated debates.  During the 
2001–2002 term, the Supreme Court continued to struggle with this 
issue.  In Atkins v. Virginia,1 where the Court invalidated the death 
penalty for the developmentally disabled, this conflict was at its apo-
gee.  Chief Justice Rehnquist argued forcefully: 
I write separately . . . to call attention to the defects in the Court’s 
decision to place weight on foreign laws. . . . In reaching its conclu-
sion today, the Court . . . adverts to the fact that other countries 
have disapproved imposition of the death penalty for crimes com-
mitted by mentally retarded offenders . . . . I fail to see, however, 
how the views of other countries regarding the punishment of their 
citizens provide any support for the Court’s ultimate determina-
tion. . . . [W]e have . . . explicitly rejected the idea that the sentenc-
ing practices of other countries could serve to establish the first 
Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that a practice is accepted among 
our people. . . . For if it is evidence of a national consensus for 
which we are looking, then the viewpoints of other countries simply 
are not relevant.2 
Justice Scalia seconded this: 
[T]he prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate “na-
tional consensus” must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a 
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 1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 2. Id. at 322–25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citations and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
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footnote) to the views of assorted professional and religious organi-
zations, members of the so-called “world community,” and respon-
dents to opinion polls. . . . [T]he practices of the “world commu-
nity,” whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of 
our people[,] [are irrelevant].3 
This stinging criticism was indeed caused by a single sentence in 
a single footnote.4  In addressing the criticism of the dissents, Justice 
Stevens added that although comparative arguments “are by no 
means dispositive,” they still lend “further support to our conclusion 
that there is a consensus among those who have addressed the issue 
[of capital punishment for the developmentally disabled].”5 
A second major case of the term, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,6 
which involved school vouchers, also contained arguments relying on 
comparative experience.  In this case, however, the comparative ar-
guments were outlined by the dissenters.  Justice Stevens stressed the 
influence of comparative experience in the Balkans, Northern Ire-
land, and the Middle East in evaluating religious funding of primary 
education.7  Justice Breyer, arguing that the funding of religious 
schools might contribute to “religious strife,” referred to the British 
and French experience: 
I recognize that other nations, for example Great Britain and 
France, have in the past reconciled religious school funding and re-
ligious freedom without creating serious strife.  Yet British and 
French societies are religiously more homogeneous—and it bears 
noting that recent waves of immigration have begun to create prob-
lems of social division there as well.8 
These two cases from the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrate that 
debate over the use of comparative reasoning in constitutional inter-
pretation9 is far from concluded.  Two issues in particular are left 
 
 3. Id. at 347–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 4. “Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes 
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.” Id. at  316–17 
(Stevens, J.). 
 5. Id. 
 6. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 7. “Admittedly, in reaching that conclusion I have been influenced by my understanding 
of the impact of religious strife on the decisions of our forbears to migrate to this continent, and 
on the decisions of neighbors in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East to mistrust 
one another.  Whenever we remove a brick from the wall that was designed to separate religion 
and government, we increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the foundation of our de-
mocracy.”  Id. at 685–86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 8. Id. at 725 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 9. The Supreme Court’s use of comparative experience is not limited to cases involving 
constitutional law.  For example, one argument put forward in support of the holding that elec-
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open in these decisions.  The first issue is openly and vehemently 
brought out by the dissenters in Atkins v. Virginia—namely, whether 
the use of comparative constitutional law in domestic adjudication is 
appropriate at all.  When courts choose to accept comparative consti-
tutional arguments they must then address a second issue—the weight 
of comparative arguments relative to other methods of analysis.  
This article tries to provide answers to these two questions.  It 
will make a contribution to the growing literature on comparative 
constitutional law in three ways.  First, this paper systematically dis-
tinguishes between different uses of comparative law.  I will show 
how comparative experience could theoretically contribute to solving 
both normative and empirical questions.  However, because norma-
tive and empirical reasoning are each based on different types of ma-
terials, these forms of reasoning each result in unique legitimacy and 
practical problems, and as a result. The weights of comparative argu-
ments often vary.10  Moreover, different courts may not employ com-
parative reasoning consistently, or at the same rate as other courts.   
Second, this article outlines scholarly treatment of comparative 
reasoning by social scientists, and especially by political scientists.  In-
creasingly, critics of legal analysis specifically highlight the deficit of 
interdisciplinary approaches to legal questions,11 and such approaches 
are particularly suited to comparative studies.   
Finally, this paper distinguishes between strategic and legal pur-
poses for utilizing foreign materials and comparative experience.  I 
argue that there is a difference between what constitutes a good legal 
argument and what makes a decision useful in relation to the strategic 
goals the court or individual justice might pursue outside of legal 
analysis.  If comparative experience has not been used as the basis for 
a court’s holding, I term this use “strategic” or “soft.”  I will show that 
the courts may invoke comparative arguments, or may specifically 
avoid these arguments, because of strategic calculations, both based 
 
tronic publishers infringed upon the copyrights of freelance writers by reproducing and distrib-
uting works in electronic databases was that “[c]ourts in other nations, applying their domestic 
copyright laws, have also concluded that Internet or CD-ROM reproduction and distribution of 
freelancers’ works violate the copyrights of freelancers.”  N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 
505 n.13 (2001) (Ginsburg, J.).   
 10. See Ulrich Drobnig, The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, in THE USE OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS 17–19 (Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef van Erp eds., 1999) (showing 
that the courts use both foreign rules and the information about effects of the rules, but discuss-
ing the weight of comparative arguments based only on the rules). 
 11. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 118 
(2002) (arguing that the subfield of methodology of law should be developed by encouraging 
contact between several disciplines). 
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on institutional and individual concerns.  The strategic or “soft” use 
enables a court to broaden acceptance of the decision in the eyes of 
the public or other political institutions, or may assist in achieving in-
ternational goals.  For example, strategic uses of comparative argu-
ments may give a court’s legal analysis the appearance of being based 
on “legal” considerations when the decision itself is actually moti-
vated more by political concerns.  This distinction between legal and 
strategic uses of foreign experience provides an explanation for the 
differences in practice among various courts citing foreign experience. 
This paper begins with a brief overview of the relevant literature.  
The second part of the paper outlines three uses of comparative law.  
The next three parts of the paper describe the practice, strengths, and 
weaknesses of each approach.  In the sixth part, I describe strategic 
uses of comparative arguments and show that these strategic uses are 
useful in explaining the differences between courts in citing compara-
tive experience.  I conclude with a discussion of the possible ways in 
which research on the uses of comparative law can be developed. 
II.  FIVE AREAS OF COMPARATIVE  
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Literature on comparative constitutional law12 can be roughly di-
vided into five strands.13  First, there is literature on foreign countries’ 
constitutional law from the perspective of an “outsider,” or country 
evaluations on a general level.14  Such works may, but usually do not, 
 
 12. For an earlier thorough overview, see generally James A. Thomson, Comparative Con-
stitutional Law: Entering the Quagmire, 6 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 22 (1989). 
 13. Casebooks are exceptions, covering different fields of comparative constitutional law.  
See, e.g., MAURO CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (1979); VICKI JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999). 
 14. See generally FRANCOIS VENTER, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON: JAPAN, GERMANY, 
CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA AS CONSTITUTIONAL STATES (2000) (comparing the constitu-
tional law of Germany, Japan, Canada and South Africa).  On France, see generally JOHN S. 
BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1992) (providing an overview of French constitutional 
law doctrine); Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the 
United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363 (1982) (arguing that several constitutional issues can be 
solved with the help of separation-of-powers analysis); Martin A. Rogoff, A Comparison of 
Constitutionalism in France and the United States, 49 ME. L. REV. 21 (1997) (broadly comparing 
the approaches of France and the U.S. in constitutional interpretation).  On Germany, see gen-
erally EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY 
AND THE UNITED STATES (2002) (analyzing the approaches of Germany and the U.S. related to 
restricting personal freedoms); DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2nd ed. 1997) (providing an overview of the most 
important cases of the German Constitutional Court); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION 
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involve “comparison” as such.  Sometimes generalized conclusions 
may be offered.15  A second type of literature focuses on constitu-
tional theory, rule of law, and judicial review.16  A third focuses on 
substantive constitutional law issues, and compares approaches by 
different countries, or otherwise reviews the solutions of one country 
from an “outsider” perspective or for an outside reader.  Such issues 
are very diverse, and have ranged from free speech17 to affirmative ac-
tion.18  Fourth, there are papers that advocate the adoption of a par-
ticular constitutional system19 or specific solutions to constitutional 
 
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1994) (providing an overview of German constitu-
tional law). 
 15. See, e.g., Bojan Bugaric, Courts as Policy-Makers: Lessons from Transition, 42 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 247 (2001) (arguing that the East European constitutional courts have been poor pol-
icy-makers when deciding complex social and economic issues related to transition); HERMAN 
SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 
(2000) (arguing that the Eastern European constitutional courts have been helpful in maintain-
ing the democratic system). 
 16. See generally M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
(2nd ed. 1998) (describing the history of the concept of separation of powers); Ran Hirschl, 
Looking Sideways, Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards: Judicial Review vs. Democracy in 
Comparative Perspective, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 415 (2000) (arguing the utility of learning from 
the experience of other countries in deciding constitutional issues); HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (David M. Beatty ed., 1994) (providing de-
scriptions of the various judicial review systems); J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European 
Constitutionalism and its Discontents, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 354 (1996–97) (analyzing the 
constitutionalization process of the European Union); Stephen Gardbaum, The New Common-
wealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001) (providing an analysis of 
American and Commonwealth models of constitutionalism and judicial review). 
 17. For instance, on texts involving just U.S.–Canadian comparisons, see Ian Slotin, Free 
Speech and the Visage Culturel: Canadian and American Perspectives on Pop Culture Discrimi-
nation, 111 YALE L.J. 2289 (2002); Marie-France Major, Comparative Analogies: Sullivan Visits 
the Commonwealth, 10 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 17 (1999); Donald L. Beschle, Clearly Ca-
nadian? Hill v. Colorado and Free Speech Balancing in the United States and Canada, 28 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187 (2001); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and Can-
ada, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1992). 
 18. E.g., Jan Lodewyk Pretorius, Constitutional Standards for Affirmative Action in South 
Africa: A Comparative Overview, 61; ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES 
RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 403 (2001); ANNE PETERS, WOMEN, QUOTAS, AND 
CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR WOMEN UNDER 
AMERICAN, GERMAN, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999); SUNITA 
PARIKH, THE POLITICS OF PREFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA (1997); Kendall Thomas, The Political Economy of 
Recognition: Affirmative Action Discourse and Constitutional Equality in Germany and the 
U.S.A., 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 329 (1999); THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1990); POLITICS OF POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION: A CROSS 
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Subatra Kumar Mitra ed., 1990).   
 19. Consider the recent discussion over the vices and virtues of the presidential system of 
government.  See generally Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 633 (2000); Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor 
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problems.20  This trend has especially gained momentum after the 
break-up of the Communist Bloc.21  These papers tend to address the 
issue of legal drafting22 with less emphasis on legal interpretation, fol-
lowing the idea that the two questions are somehow distinct.23 
The fifth strand of literature deals with comparative constitu-
tional law as a process or discipline and describes its value, goals, and 
methods.  This article belongs to this strand of literature.  More spe-
cifically, this strand explores how courts employ comparative consti-
tutional analysis—drawing conclusions about the strategies courts 
rely on in selecting comparative constitutional arguments. 
 
Ackerman Is Wrong to Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51 
(2001). 
 20. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-
COMMUNIST APPLICATION 225, 229 (András Sajó ed., 1996) (arguing that social rights should be 
guaranteed through legislation to “reserve the constitution for other matters”); Herman 
Schwartz, Do Economic and Social Rights Belong in a Constitution, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 1233 (1995) (arguing that a constitution should contain positive rights). 
 21. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, American Advice and New Constitutions, 1 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 173 
(2000) (providing a commentary on the Draft Ukrainian Constitution). 
 22. To stress the importance of comparative law when drafting statutes is actually mislead-
ing.  The benefits of comparison are the greatest when one considers the policy underlying the 
statute, not the statute as such.  Also, it is important to consider comparative experience not 
only when drafting statutes (creating new policy), but also when analyzing the performance of 
existing statutes (existing policies).  Comparative policy analysis has performed this task for a 
long time, and its usefulness has not been doubted in the political science literature as much as 
in the legal circles.  See generally JESSICA R. ADOLINO & CHARLES H. BLAKE, COMPARING 
PUBLIC POLICIES: ISSUES AND CHOICES IN SIX INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES (2001); FRANCIS 
G. CASTLES, COMPARATIVE PUBLIC POLICY: PATTERNS OF POST-WAR TRANSFORMATION 
(1998); HUGH HECLO ET AL., COMPARATIVE PUBLIC POLICY: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL 
CHOICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA (3rd. ed. 1990). 
 23. Such is the view expressed by Justice Scalia in Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) 
(“We think such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, 
though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one.”). However, the arguments and 
methods put forward in this paper largely apply to legal drafting as well.  When drafting consti-
tutions or statutes, the same kinds of normative and empirical questions arise as when interpret-
ing the law.  Cf. Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 447, 476 (1991) (“In constitutional debates, one invariably finds a large number of refer-
ences to other constitutions, as models to be imitated, as disasters to be avoided, or simply as 
evidence for certain views about human nature.”); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, DRAFTING A 
CONSTITUTION FOR A NATION OR REPUBLIC EMERGING INTO FREEDOM (2d ed. 1994) (de-
scribing the influence of foreign constitutions in drafting the “new” constitutions); Rett R. 
Ludwikowski, “Mixed” Constitutions—Product of an East-Central European Constitutional 
Melting Pot, 16 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (1998) (arguing that the constitution-drafters borrowed from a 
variety of sources).  Comparative law can be helpful, but also inappropriate, when dealing with 
legislative change. 
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Several authors have reviewed the use of comparative materials 
by appellate courts.24  Some have undertaken statistical studies on ci-
tations to foreign law.25  This approach has been combined by some 
with a more analytical approach to comparative constitutional law.  
Political scientists, relying on analytical approaches which focus on 
judges’ motivations, have tried to explain the differences between 
various courts’ citation practices.26  However, other than these few 
rare positive analyses, the literature largely focuses on whether and 
how courts and other decision-makers should use comparative consti-
tutional law. 
In evaluating the use of comparative experience, three different 
types of issues are usually addressed: the systematization of the uses 
of comparative law, legitimacy problems of comparative reasoning, 
and practical difficulties of comparison.  Attempts to categorize uses 
of comparative law by courts are numerous.  Although most authors 
claim that there are three uses of comparative constitutional law, 
there is a general lack of coherency among these classifications.  For 
example, Tushnet discusses functionalism, expressivism, and brico-
 
 24. Similarly, the use of comparative law generally, not only in comparative constitutional 
law, has been thoroughly discussed.  See generally THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS 
(Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef van Erp eds., 1999) (providing a survey of twelve countries and the 
European Union); MARKKU KIIKERI, COMPARATIVE LEGAL REASONING AND EUROPEAN 
LAW 77–92 (2001) (based on interviews with the judges and functionaries of the courts in Eng-
land, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Italy, and France).  For the Netherlands, see T. Koopmans, 
Comparative Law and the Courts, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 545, 550–55 (1996). 
 25. In Australia, see generally Paul E. von Nessen, The Use of American Precedents by the 
High Court of Australia, 1901–1987, 14 ADEL. L. REV. 181 (1992).  In Canada, see generally Pe-
ter McCormick, The Supreme Court of Canada and American Citations 1945–1994: A Statistical 
Overview, 8 SUP. CT. L. REV. (2d) 527 (1997); Christopher P. Manfredi, The Use of United States 
Decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada Under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 23 CAN. 
J. OF POL. SCI. 499 (1990); C. L. Ostberg et al., Attitudes, Precedents and Cultural Change: Ex-
plaining the Citation of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court of Canada, 34 CAN. J. POL. 
SCI. 377 (2001).  In the United States, the studies are usually combined with the studies on gen-
eral citation practices.  See generally Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Cen-
tury of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme 
Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative Study, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 267 (2002). 
 26. See e.g., C. L. Ostberg et al., supra note 25 (arguing that the citation of foreign prece-
dents is a form of policy emulation explained by the individual attitudes of the justices from the 
litigation strategies of the interest groups and from general values to which the justices refer); 
Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, A Tool, Not a Master: The Use of Foreign Case Law in Canada and 
South Africa, 34 COMP. POL. STUD. 1188 (2001) (arguing that judges rely on foreign precedent 
because of its utility in cutting information costs, decreasing uncertainty, and providing justifica-
tion).  See also Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Ju-
dicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 516–27 (2000) 
(describing possible explanations for the use of comparative experience). 
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lage.27  Choudhry contends that there are three modes of comparative 
constitutional interpretation: universalist, dialogical, and genealogi-
cal.  Universalist interpretation relies on the assumption that constitu-
tional principles are based on similar universal norms.  The dialogical 
approach focuses on assumptions underlying constitutional jurispru-
dence to justify or reject the use of foreign materials and experience.  
Finally, genealogical interpretation emphasizes the similar historical 
backgrounds of constitutions.28  Another way of seeing the use of 
comparative law is to differentiate between defining and justifying 
relevant issues, and clarifying the reasoning behind comparative 
analysis in moral and policy balancing.29  One can refer to “evalua-
tive,” “intentionalist,” “textualist,” and “authority-based” compari-
sons.30  One might also distinguish between “necessary” and “volun-
tary,”31 between “genealogical” and “ahistorical,” and between 
“positive” and “negative”32 recourses to comparative law.  The court 
may use comparative experience by referring to it “in dicta,” to “cre-
ate a workable principle of law” or to “prove a ‘constitutional fact.’’’33  
The court may use comparative law in order to “find a solution” or 
“justify a solution,”34 as well as for the purpose of “internal utility” or 
“external legitimacy.”35  The comparison may be “vertical” or “hori-
zontal.”36  Alternatively, one might distinguish between the “general 
and indirect,” as opposed to “specific and direct,” influence of com-
 
 27. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 
(1999).  
 28. Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Compara-
tive Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 825–26 (1999). 
 29. Louis J. Blum, Mixed Signals: The Limited Role of Comparative Analysis in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 157, 160 (2002). 
 30. Jens C. Dammann, The Role of Comparative Law in Statutory and Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 513, 519–22 (2002).  “Evaluative” comparison refers to the 
use of foreign materials to evaluate the likely consequences of specific interpretation.  “Inten-
tionalist” comparison is used to ascertain the intent of the legislator, especially when “borrowed 
statute doctrine” applies.  “Textualist comparisons” can ascertain the common meaning of the 
terms at the time a statute was adopted.  “Authority-based” comparisons are made when the 
courts advance foreign statutes or decisions as arguments in favor of or against a particular in-
terpretation. 
 31. Drobnig, supra note 10, at 6. 
 32. David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 
550–51 (2001). 
 33. Id. at 552–56. 
 34. Koopmans, supra note 24 at 550. 
 35. Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitu-
tional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 254–63 (2001). 
 36. KIIKERI, supra note 24, at 194, 298. 
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parative constitutional materials, as well as between explicit and non-
explicit uses of comparative constitutional law.37 
The diversity that we see in these classifications of comparative 
analysis illustrate that a systematic approach to this topic has not 
been developed.  Certainly, the analyses of different authors overlap.  
However, none of these classifications attempts to be exhaustive, nor 
are any of these classifications necessarily mutually exclusive.  I will 
turn to this issue in the next section of the article. 
III.  LEGITIMACY AND PRACTICABILITY ISSUES IN 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
While most authors focus on classifications of comparative law, 
few actually address its legitimacy.  This is surprising, as there is a 
genuine dispute between U.S. Supreme Court justices on the issue, 
some of whom explicitly reject the legitimacy of comparative reason-
ing.38 
Perhaps the most common discussion of legitimacy focuses on 
the universal character of some constitutional norms, particularly 
human rights provisions.  It has been argued that courts should look 
at foreign practices because such practices often reflect norms of a 
universal character.  As an example, the universal character of human 
rights norms is argued to demand a universal application of these 
rights.39  Drobnig, who writes about both comparative constitutional 
law and the use of comparative law in general, distinguishes between 
different types of comparison, basing the legitimacy of comparative 
arguments mostly on the international character of the norms.40 
There are alternatives to this proposition.  The question of le-
gitimacy is the main issue in Dammann’s analysis.41  Dammann con-
tends that the legitimacy problem of “intentionalist,” “textualist,” and 
 
 37. McCrudden, supra note 26, at 510–11. 
 38. Consider the dissents in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), or the majority opinion 
in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (arguing that “it is American conceptions 
of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various amici . . . 
that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant”) (Scalia, J.). 
 39. For a discussion, see McCrudden, supra note 26, at 527–29; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A 
Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 120–22 (1994); Claire 
L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of 
the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 24–25 (1998). 
 40. Drobnig, supra note 10, at 19–21.  He has no clear explanation for applying compara-
tive law in “purely domestic” cases.  He presents two functions that comparative arguments 
might have—to fill legal gaps or to overcome an outmoded rule.  Id. at 21. 
 41. Dammann, supra note 30. 
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“authority-based comparisons,” is minimal, as these analytical meth-
ods are generally based on traditional interpretation techniques.  In 
order to justify “authority-based comparisons,” Dammann refers to 
the general discourse theory developed by Habermas, who theorizes 
that the truthfulness of legal analysis is supported by the fact that le-
gal decision-makers who follow similar basic procedural rules also 
reach similar conclusions.42  According to Dammann, comparative 
analysis is therefore legitimate because courts in different countries 
follow similar basic procedural rules. 
Tushnet similarly distinguishes between uses of comparative con-
stitutional law—he sees no considerable legitimacy problems for func-
tionalist or expressivist uses of comparative constitutional law, as they 
do not form an authority for the court.43  Tushnet justifies the use of 
bricolage, the practice of constructing a legal argument from argu-
ments used by foreign courts, by the fact that foreign materials are of-
ten used unconsciously.  Bricolage is thus nothing but a natural prac-
tice that warrants its own use.44 
A survey of the existing literature suggests that the practical 
problems of comparative constitutional law are often discussed.  
These include the difficulty of comprehending foreign law,45 the ten-
dency of decision-makers to take cases out of their wider social and 
cultural context,46 the difficulty in determining the effects of laws 
abroad,47 and the problems of transferring such experience into the 
domestic system.48  The literature fares excellently in discussing prac-
tical problems in comparative analysis.  However, there are limits to 
this literature.  The literature does not distinguish clearly between the 
 
 42. Id. at 540–54.  KIIKERI bases his justification for comparative reasoning also on dis-
course theory.  See supra note 24, at 307–14. 
 43. Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1234–37. 
 44. Id. at 1237–38. 
 45. Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of 
Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640, 647 (1999) (“verbal similarities may be mis-
leading”). 
 46. Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16 LEGAL STUD. 232, 236 (1996) (the compara-
tivists often “forget about the historical, social, economic, political, cultural, and psychological 
context which has made that rule or proposition what it is”); Christopher Osakwe, Introduction: 
The Problems of the Comparability of Notions in Constitutional Law, 59 TUL. L. REV. 876 
(1985) (“Public law reflects an inner relationship—a sort of spiritual and psychical relation-
ship—with the people over whom it operates.”). 
 47. E.g., Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1265 (arguing that any number of variables could have 
determined the observed outcomes, not just the law that is being discussed). 
 48. Fontana, supra note 32, at 556 (arguing that the courts could hire experts to solve such 
issues). 
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different uses of comparative constitutional law and the different 
types of practical problems that emerge with these uses.  Also, the lit-
erature does not address issues that have been identified by scholars 
in other fields, as many of the practical problems arising from com-
parative constitutional analysis arise in all comparative studies, and 
arguably have little to do with the legitimacy problems that judges 
have to address in the constitutional realm.  Discussion of compara-
tive legal analysis would profit immensely from an interdisciplinary 
approach.   
Finally, existing literature is often neither explicit nor consistent 
in defining what “comparative experience” means.  Constitutional 
case law from foreign courts certainly is included.  However, there is 
less certainty whether or not constitutions, statutes, and other kinds 
of information should be included in comparative analysis.  What 
about the text of the constitution or statutes?  What about other kinds 
of information from foreign systems?49  I will discuss whether differ-
ent materials are suitable for different types of reasoning and why 
these materials potentially give rise to various legitimacy and practi-
cal problems.  In my own analysis, reference to comparative constitu-
tional law (also termed comparative or foreign “experience”) will be 
quite broad, and will include the use of any kind of information from 
other jurisdictions.  The “information” can be contained in the texts 
of constitutions, statutes, cases, government documents, but also all 
other kinds of economic or social data.50 
IV.  THE THREE USES OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW BY THE COURTS 
For practical purposes, the use of comparative law in the consti-
tutional context can be classified into three categories: soft use, com-
parative normative reasoning, and comparative empirical reasoning.  
 
 49. Some authors are rather consistent.  Consider the approach in Jens C. Dammann, The 
Role of Comparative Law in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
513, 517–21 (2002).  His starting approach is broad, as his purpose is to develop “a general justi-
fication for comparative reasoning in the context of interpretation” and describing “compara-
tive reasoning” as “any reasoning that somehow refers to foreign law”.  Id. at 517, 519.  How-
ever, when relying on discourse theory to develop the justification, he explicitly refers to 
“authority-based comparisons.”  Id. at 521. 
 50. Existing scholarship tends to be quite superficial when discussing this issue.  Some ex-
plicitly deal with case law.  See Choudhry, supra note 28, at 824 (The goal is “to describe and 
explain the interpretive methodologies used, and the normative justifications offered, by courts 
for their use of comparative jurisprudence in constitutional interpretation.”).  Some refer to so-
cial data and case law interchangeably.  E.g., Tushnet, supra note 27. 
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First, a differentiation needs to be made between “soft” and “hard” 
uses of comparative experience.  The former describes the process of 
discussing foreign statutes, cases, or practices in the decision-making 
process or in the text of judicial opinions without relying on this ex-
perience in reaching the holding.  In these instances, foreign experi-
ence is mentioned, but it has no precedential value.  The “hard” use 
of comparative experience, however, contributes directly to the hold-
ing of the case, and possesses at least some degree of authority for the 
court.  Of course, comparative experience need not be central to a 
holding.  In these cases, foreign materials utilized in the opinion only 
add weight to the court’s argument.  What is important is that these 
materials have legal significance in the opinion.  Their inclusion is not 
just a matter of judicial rhetoric, for omission of these materials 
would reduce the persuasiveness of the argument.51 
The “hard” use of comparative experience serves two purposes.  
First, one might acquire help in making normative judgments, either 
when balancing different constitutional values or when interpreting 
broad constitutional principles.52  Second, foreign materials may assist 
in making empirical observations and predictions about the conse-
quences of a judicial determination.  Essentially, comparative materi-
als may be utilized in either normative or empirical judgments. 
In making this sharp distinction between “hard” and “soft” uses, 
I argue that techniques of legal reasoning such as filling gaps in laws 
and creating legal tests for the analysis of legal concepts53 are in real-
ity not merely techniques that can simply be adopted with the help of 
comparative reasoning.  For example, Jackson recommends that the 
U.S. Supreme Court should look at comparative constitutional law to 
discover “proportionality” analysis.54  This analysis would require bal-
ancing restrictions to constitutional rights with the aims of such re-
strictions.  At first sight, this might seem to be a rather technical ap-
 
 51. But see Koopmans, supra note 24, at 550 (“A method consisting of relying on compara-
tive materials in order to justify the solution is not always interesting from a legal point of view.  
Very often, the court might have used a different argument to arrive at exactly the same deci-
sion. . . . It is more or less a matter of judicial rhetoric.”). 
 52. I do not need to delve into the discussion of whether normative judgments by the 
courts relying on broad principles are in themselves acceptable or not.  For purposes of this arti-
cle, I will be satisfied with the observation that the courts simply rely on these principles. 
 53. This is where Drobnig sees great usefulness in comparative law.  See Drobnig, supra 
note 10, at 21. 
 54. Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening 
Up the Conversation on “Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583 
(1999) (arguing that the U.S. courts could learn from the experience of foreign courts such as 
the Canadian Supreme Court and adopt proportionality analysis). 
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plication of a legal test.  However, adopting proportionality analysis 
actually requires the adoption of a normative position carrying a cer-
tain empirical assumption.  This adoption normatively assumes that it 
is “right” to balance different values in constitutional adjudication.  
Further, proportionality analysis carries an empirical assumption that 
courts are the suitable venue for balancing conflicting values, that is,  
that certain positive consequences result from the fact that courts en-
gage in this balancing.  One could, of course, test this empirical as-
sumption by analyzing available comparative evidence.  Proportional-
ity analysis is not a technical process, and similarly other55 “technical” 
issues that the courts face actually involve complex normative judg-
ments and empirical predictions. 
It is essential to distinguish between a court’s use of normative 
reasoning in contrast to empirical reasoning.  Different rules govern 
the use of comparative materials in each situation.  Additionally, the 
legitimacy and practical limits of comparative materials is different 
when assessing normative questions on one hand and empirical ques-
tions on the other.  Analyzing the various uses of comparative law al-
lows one to make recommendations regarding comparative analysis 
according to the specific type of court at issue.  The next three sec-
tions of this article provide a description of each type of use of com-
parative reasoning and give examples from cases where foreign mate-
rials have been utilized.  Thereafter, I will turn to the legitimacy and 
practicability problems for each use and discuss the weight of each 
type of comparative reasoning.  I will conclude each part with a dis-
cussion of the context where such type of reasoning could be useful. 
 
 55. There is some support from comparative experience that courts adopting extensive 
proportionality analysis might shape the policy process, giving rise to the “judicialization of poli-
tics.”  Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination 
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1995) (using Canadian and French 
case studies and arguing that more-than-minimal judicial review causes policy distortion and 
poses difficult problems for democratic debilitation and operation of a stable and vigorous con-
stitutional democracy).  See also ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000) (arguing that the European constitutional courts 
have features of a “third chamber” of the parliament); C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder, Judi-
cialization and the Future of Politics and Policy, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL 
POWER 515 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1995) (describing the increase in power of 
judicial institutions around the globe). 
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V.  ‘SOFT’ USE OF COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCE 
A. The Soft Use as a “Dialogue” 
The “soft” use of comparative experience generally involves in-
stances where a court references foreign materials but does not con-
sider these material to have precedential weight.  Choudhry describes 
this process as dialogical interpretation, under which the courts “iden-
tify the normative and factual assumptions underlying their own con-
stitutional jurisprudence by engaging with comparable jurisprudence 
of other jurisdictions”56 to “better understand their own constitutional 
systems and jurisprudence.”57  Engaging in such a dialogue is a varia-
tion of transjudicial communication,58 or the “international traffic in 
ideas,”59 resulting in “cross-fertilization” of decisions.60  In the soft 
version of comparative reasoning, courts evaluate foreign experience 
61 as a “source of inspiration.”62  One way to consider soft analysis is as 
a mechanism employing foreign decisions as “superstar amicus 
briefs.”63  Further, the sources used in “soft comparison” are almost 
exclusively constitutional cases.  In utilizing these materials, courts 
evaluate foreign case law to discover a variety of approaches to ana-
lyzing constitutional problems64 and to reject “false necessities”—
legal doctrines that seem indispensable, but really are not.65  Tushnet 
sees the utility in foreign cases in even more general terms, arguing 
that “[w]e can learn from experience elsewhere by looking at the ex-
 
 56. Choudhry, supra note 28, at 825. 
 57. Id. at 836. 
 58. Slaughter, supra note 39, at 99. 
 59. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 158 (1991). 
 60. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1116–19 (2000). 
 61. E.g., Kai Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View, 
16 B.U. INT’L L.J. 331, 350–60 (1998) (arguing that the foreign sources constitute a “source for 
ideas and solutions”). 
 62. Koopmans, supra note 24, at 545 (arguing that there is more awareness of comparative 
materials and that they may be a source of inspiration for legal decisions). 
 63. Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World’s a Courtroom: Judging in 
the New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 287 (1997). 
 64. Dammann, supra note 30 (taking this approach further and arguing that discourse the-
ory legitimizes the use of foreign precedents as an authority for the domestic court).  “[T]here 
are two reasons why courts should resort to authority-based comparisons.  The fact that another 
court has reached the same conclusion indicates that a particular interpretation is the result of a 
fairly rational discourse.  In addition, a court can ‘artificially’ increase the number of partici-
pants in the legal discourse underlying its interpretation by considering the decisions of foreign 
courts.”  Id. at 559. 
 65. Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1227. 
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perience in rather general terms, and then by seeing how those terms 
might help us think about the constitutional problems we confront.”66  
He calls this process the “expressivist” use of comparative experience, 
which helps “us see our own practices in a new light and might lead 
courts using non-comparative methods to results they would not have 
reached had they not consulted the comparative material.”67 
Courts may realize that the decision of a foreign court is persua-
sive and may adopt similar reasoning, not because the reasoning is 
contained in a judicial opinion, but because of the reasoning itself.68  
These uses do not mean that the foreign experience itself is a binding 
or persuasive authority for the court.  The similarities between the 
two decisions may be merely coincidental.  The mere fact that a court 
has reached a conclusion that is similar to a foreign court decision 
does not mean that a borrowing from the foreign court has taken 
place.69 
The “soft” use of comparative constitutional law deals mostly 
with foreign case law.  This is rather logical, as foreign judgments are 
legal documents often addressing legal issues similar to those facing a 
domestic judge.  Therefore, the “soft” use of comparative constitu-
tional law is the type of comparative constitutional law that is most 
often referred to and probably most often used by different courts. 
It is rather difficult to identify cases that limit the use of com-
parative constitutional law in “soft” ways.  It is unusual for a court to 
discuss a foreign case, only to admit that the discussion was irrelevant 
for its holding.  At the same time, courts do not refer to a foreign case 
as having precedential authority.  Courts use terms such as “useful,”70 
 
 66. Id. at 1308. 
 67. Id. at 1236. 
 68. R.Y. Jennings, The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of Inter-
national Law, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 9 (1996) (“There are two ways of referring to a previous 
judgment: as with juridical opinion it can be used in order to quote a passage which seems to put 
something rather well; but this is quite different from citing the decision as something having 
those other qualities which make up a precedent.”). 
 69. Matthew D. Adler, Can Constitutional Borrowing Be Justified? A Comment on Tush-
net, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 350, 350–51 (1998). 
 70. E.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997–98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari) (arguing that the views of foreign courts are “useful even though not binding”).  
This language has also been adopted by many commentators.  See Lord Irvine of Lairg, Activ-
ism and Restraint: Human Rights and the Interpretative Process, in HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 
NEW MILLENNIUM 1, 5 (Frances Butler ed., 2000) (“[T]he jurisprudence of constitutional courts 
in other jurisdictions is a useful source of guidance. . . .”). 
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“helpful,” 71 or “instructive.”72  A court might state that it agrees with 
the reasoning of the foreign decision.73  It may also mention foreign 
cases in passing and state that foreign courts have reached similar re-
sults, without giving explicit reasons why the reference was inserted 
into the opinion.74  Courts may declare that a foreign precedent “sup-
ports” the court’s own conclusion or otherwise offers “guidance” in 
making its conclusion.  Often, such a reference is made only in a foot-
note.75  Sometimes the line between mere referral and acknowledging 
the persuasive weight of a foreign decision is especially difficult to 
draw, as when courts refer to a foreign decision and then explicitly 
adopt the decision’s reasoning.76 
Sometimes courts discuss “helpful” foreign cases, only to admit 
later that the decision of the foreign court was inapplicable due to dif-
ferent legal, social, or economic circumstances.  Canada has often re-
jected the use of U.S. precedents.77  For example, in Regina v. Keeg-
stra, the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly stated that: 
 
 71. See R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R. 697, 740 (Can.) (In examining issues of constitutional 
protection of free expression under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the com-
parative experience of the United States should not be “overlooked.”). 
 72. E.g., State v. Walters, 2002 (7) BCLR 663 (SA), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za 
(arguing that Tenn. v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), is “instructive” in determining the test of de-
termining the permissibility of use of deadly force in making an arrest). 
 73. For example, in Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another, 2001 (10) BCLR 
995, ¶ 45 (SA), the South African Constitutional Court stated that it would “adopt [a] state-
ment” from a case of the European Court of Human Rights, referring to the reasoning why the 
convention contains positive obligations on the state.  In Jordan v. State, 2002 (11) BCLR 1117, 
¶ 128 (SA), the court considered some of the “considerations” of the Canadian Supreme Court 
“as valid in South Africa as they are in Canada.” 
 74. Carmichele, 2001 (10) BCLR 995, ¶ 54  (SA), contains the following statement, to-
gether with the referral to the relevant German case: “Our Constitution is not merely a formal 
document regulating public power.  It also embodies, like the German Constitution, an objec-
tive, normative value system.”   
 75. This is where many of the recent citations to foreign cases by the U.S. Supreme Court 
have appeared. See also references by Justice Frankfurter in Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 
313, 325–326 n.1 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) and in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 251 
n.1 (1946). 
 76. In State v. Dodo, 2001 (3) SA 382, ¶ 39 (CC), the South African court stated that “the 
gross proportionality approach adopted by the US and Canadian Supreme Courts . . . can prop-
erly be employed and should be employed under our Constitution.  For the reasons advanced in 
the Canadian cases, it would not be mere disproportionality between the sentence legislated and 
the sentence merited by the offence which would lead to a limitation of the section 12(1)(e) 
right, but only gross disproportionality.”  The authority remains to be the constitution and its 
analysis; the foreign decisions are used quite as if they were briefs by the parties—not an au-
thority for the court, but worthy of agreement. 
 77. David Beatty, The Canadian Charter of Rights: Lessons and Laments, 60 MOD. L. REV. 
481, 482 (1997) (“Although US authorities are frequently referred to by the Court, it has, for the 
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Canada and the United States are not alike in every way, nor have 
the documents entrenching human rights in our two countries 
arisen in the same context.  It is only common sense to recognize 
that, just as similarities will justify borrowing from the American 
experience, differences may require that Canada’s constitutional vi-
sion depart from that endorsed in the United States.78 
The South African Constitutional Court in S. v. Makwanyane rejected 
the potential persuasive effect of U.S. decisions on the death penalty 
because of the difference in the text of the U.S. and South African 
constitutions.79  In Carmichele v. The Minister of Safety and Security,80 
the same court rejected the holding of DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services,81 which provided that the U.S. 
Constitution does not impose  certain positive duties on the govern-
ment.82  In S. v. Mamabolo, the court decided not to rely on an area of  
American First Amendment jurisprudence in deciding a case involv-
ing the crime of scandalizing a court, because the South African Con-
stitution “ranks the right to freedom of expression differently” from 
the U.S. Constitution.83  In Mohamed v. President of the Republic of 
South Africa, the South African court discussed partly supportive Ca-
nadian law, only to admit that South African and Canadian constitu-
tional provisions are different.84  Finally, Justice Mason of the Austra-
lian High Court explicitly rejected plaintiff’s reliance on U.S. case law 
on legislative apportionment in McKinlay v. Commonwealth.85 
 
most part, treated them very cautiously and usually as not being very helpful in fashioning solu-
tions that are appropriate for Canada.”). 
 78. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R. 697, 740 (Can.).   
 79. S v. Makwanyane, 1995 BCLR 665 (SA) 
 80. Carmichele, 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (SA). 
 81. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 82. “The provisions of our Constitution, however, point in the opposite direction.” Car-
michele, 2001 (4) SA 938, ¶  45 (CC). 
 83. S. v. Mamabolo, 2001 BCLR 449, ¶ 41 (CC) (SA). 
 84. Mohamed v. President of the Republic of S. Afr., 2001 (3) SA 893, ¶ 53 (CC) 
(“[W]hatever the position may be under Canadian law where deprivation of the right to life, 
liberty and human dignity is dependent upon the fundamental principles of justice, our Consti-
tution sets different standards for protecting the right to life, to human dignity and the right not 
to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.  Under our Constitution these 
rights are not qualified by other principles of justice.”). 
 85. (1975) 135 C.L.R. 57, 63 (Austl.) (“[I]t is simply not correct to say that provisions in our 
Constitution should receive the same construction as that given to similarly worded provisions 
in the United States Constitution which have a different context and a different history, more 
particularly when the suggested construction is of recent origin, reversing an interpretation pre-
viously accepted.”).  Id. at 63. 
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Even when foreign case analyses might be supportive, courts 
tend to be uneasy about applying them.86  Courts do not cite foreign 
cases strictly as part of their holding, but as an illumination of issues 
surrounding the case.  More commonly, courts admit that they were 
persuaded by the reasoning of foreign cases. 
B. The Legitimacy and Weight of the Dialogue 
When courts limit the discussion of foreign cases to a role as a 
helpful guide in the decision-making process, legitimacy issues usually 
connected with the introduction of innovative types of arguments 
generally do not arise.  Technically, foreign decisions themselves have 
no precedential authority, and thus no binding effect, in domestic 
courts.  Therefore, a court’s discussion of foreign sources need not be 
justified from a legal point of view.  If foreign sources are used selec-
tively, they do not lead to “arbitrary decision-making,”87 as long as the 
court’s analysis is based on legitimate authority. 
Under this view, borrowing ideas from foreign jurisprudence is, 
in essence, hardly different from borrowing ideas from the briefs of 
the parties or law review articles.  Rarely, if ever, does the use of 
comparative materials stand alone or occur in a vacuum—the fact 
that a foreign court has argued for the abolition of the death penalty 
is usually is not a persuasive argument in and of itself.  If it were, le-
gitimacy issues would certainly arise. 
The fact that a foreign court has used certain arguments does not 
mean that a domestic court needs to adopt the same arguments—they 
may be plainly unpersuasive, just as the arguments in the briefs may 
be unpersuasive.  A court is technically not following a foreign court’s 
decision, but rather merely being persuaded by arguments, similar to 
reliance, for example, on law review articles.88  
What about considering, referring to, and discussing foreign case 
law as persuasive authority?  In contrast to precedential authority, 
persuasive authorities are not binding—“highly sophisticated alterna-
tive[s] to notions of binding law and mechanical jurisprudence on the 
 
 86. In Mohamed, 2001 (3) SA 893, ¶ 53 (CC), the South African constitutional court dis-
cussed the Canadian constitutional law on whether deportation into a country where the person 
might face the death penalty is constitutional if the death penalty is unconstitutional in the de-
porting country, only to admit that the decision of the court is based on South African law.  
 87. McCrudden, supra note 26, at 507 (referring to the misuse of persuasive authorities). 
 88. Fontana argues that the parties should be encouraged by the judge to discuss, when 
appropriate, the decisions of the foreign courts.  Fontana, supra note 32, at 556. 
FINAL ANNUS.DOC 3/8/2005  9:44 AM 
2004] COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 319 
one hand and arbitrary personal license on the other.”89  Foreign 
precedents, thus, are arguably not binding but persuasive.90  This as-
sertion, however, assumes that persuasiveness is a result of foreign 
authority.  If we look at the courts’ practice more carefully, we see 
that what is persuasive in foreign precedents is usually the reasoning 
of the case, not the fact that the foreign court has reached that spe-
cific decision.  The fact that the reasoning of the foreign court was 
found persuasive does not mean that the authority itself was persua-
sive—similar persuasive arguments could be made in the briefs by the 
parties.91  The foreign experience itself would not be a binding author-
ity, but rather dicta.  There are no particular constraints on what the 
judge may enter into dicta.  Rather, one should ask, whether the dicta 
is practical and serves some purpose other than reaching the holding. 
This suggests that judges probably discuss foreign decisions with-
out recognizing them as binding if some strategic considerations per-
suade the judges to do so.  That the use of foreign precedent is often 
strategic can also be demonstrated by the fact that courts omit prece-
dents that do not support the holding.  Even though the omission is 
not always intentional,92 but rather due to lack of knowledge of for-
 
 89. H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 264 (1987). 
 90. Slaughter, supra note 39, at 124 (describing the use of foreign precedent as persuasive, 
but not binding); McCrudden, supra note 26, at 502–03 (describing the use of foreign precedent 
as persuasive authority). 
 91. The briefs of the parties in the South African Constitutional Court usually refer to for-
eign precedent when supporting the argument.  Therefore, we cannot assess whether the court 
would be persuaded without the references to foreign precedent. 
 92. There seem to exist completely intentional omissions.  In Mohamed, 2001 (3) SA 893, ¶ 
53 (CC),  the South African Constitutional Court dealt with a case where the South African 
government handed an alleged terrorist who illegally entered South Africa over to United 
States’ authorities without seeking an agreement that no death penalty would be involved if 
Mohamed would be convicted of crimes.  The court discussed several foreign cases, including a 
similar case from the European Court of Human Rights, however, the court referred only to the 
part of the decision where the actions of the government were condemned, but not to the part 
where the court, contrary to the holding of the South African constitutional court, explicitly al-
lowed the extradition of the person to a country applying the death penalty as long as the pen-
alty is carried out in conformity with due process rules.  Id. at ¶ 56.  Similar problems occurred 
in Prince v. President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope, 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (SA), 
where the court found the prohibition of the use of cannabis for adherents of the Rastafari relig-
ion constitutional.  The only reference of the minority opinion to foreign case law or practice 
was to the dissent by Justice Blackmun in Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Ore-
gon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 911 n.54 (1990), which discussed only the question of which govern-
ment interests such a prohibition might serve.  The majority discussed the foreign practice more 
extensively, but limited the analysis to favorable case law only.  See 2002 (3) BCLR 231, ¶¶ 119–
127 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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eign law,93 precedents are used selectively.  The strategic nature of 
discussing foreign cases becomes even more evident if we consider 
that judges often discuss foreign decisions among themselves or with 
the justices of different supreme courts.94  Whether to make these dis-
cussions public is largely a strategic decision, as the opinion can also 
be written without inclusion of these discussions.  Surely, the legiti-
macy of “soft use” comparisons does not become an issue when for-
eign decisions are not discussed in the published opinion, but rather 
used behind the scenes.  Reading and drawing from foreign case law 
would in such cases be a part of the “general liberal education”95 of 
the judge.   
When a court does refer to foreign materials, the question be-
comes whether it is advisable for it to do so.  When making such ref-
erences, courts must discuss materials that have no authoritative 
power, do not directly contribute toward the holding in a case, and 
yet demand an understanding of foreign laws and cases in all their 
complexity.  Because of this, referrals seem to be an unnecessary bur-
den that may even distract attention from a holding’s rationale.  By 
definition, foreign cases do not refer to the case at hand.  Foreign 
cases not only take place in a different factual setting, but also in an 
extremely different socio-cultural setting.  The informational advan-
tage gained through deciding cases or controversies only, much em-
phasized when describing the courts’ proper functions, would simply 
be lost.   
 
 93. An example comes from the European Court of Justice, where Advocate General Te-
sauro used U.S. precedents on affirmative action only selectively, omitting the most similar case 
with different conclusions from the ECJ holding.  See Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hans-
estadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. I-3051.  Kalanke cites Regents of University of Cal. v. Bakke, 483 
U.S. 265 (1978); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CFL v. Webster, 443 U.S. 193 
(1979); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), but not Johnson v. Transp. 
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)). This has been attributed to ignorance; not intentional omission.  
See McCrudden, supra note 26, at 526. 
 94. Fontana, supra note 32, at 548 (describing the encounters between justices of different 
supreme courts); McCrudden, supra note 26, at 510–11 (describing the use of colloquia for 
judges on human rights issues).   
 95. This is how Tushnet legitimizes expressivist uses of comparative constitutional law.  See 
Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1236–37 (“[J]udges of wide learning—whether in comparative consti-
tutional law, in the classics of literature, in economics, or in many other fields—may see things 
about our society that judges with a narrower vision miss. . . . In this aspect, comparative consti-
tutional law operates in the way that general liberal education does.”). 
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C. Conclusion 
Judicial use of foreign precedents as a source of ideas and argu-
ments can be a useful enterprise.  In any case, this use cannot be pro-
hibited, as such use is often not uniformly documented in the written 
opinion.  However, a court’s public admission that it was inspired by 
foreign decisions does not add or diminish weight from the legal ar-
gument.  This admission may only serve strategic purposes about 
what the court wants to achieve through the decision.  At the same 
time, courts need to balance potential strategic gains with the possi-
bility of misunderstanding and misapplying foreign case law. 
VI.  THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN MAKING 
NORMATIVE JUDGMENTS 
Constitutions often use terms that are difficult to interpret, such 
as the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment prohibition of “cruel 
and unusual” punishment, or the German constitutional directive to 
protect “human dignity.”96  Similar difficulties are met in judicial bal-
ancing.  Balancing is a process of weighing different values and mak-
ing normative judgments on preferred values.  Balancing different 
constitutional values, although often criticized,97 is both common and 
theoretically unavoidable.98  Most courts explicitly admit this, and 
some, like the German99 or South African100 constitutional courts, ele-
vate balancing to a fundamental tenet constitutional jurisprudence. 
Much of constitutional jurisprudence is about deriving meaning 
from broad principles and finding the right balance between different 
values.  In determining the content of such broad principles and find-
ing the right balance between conflicting values, one may apply dif-
 
 96. Article 1 of the Basic Law of Germany: “Human dignity is inviolable.” GG Art. 1. 
 97. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 
(1987). 
 98. The philosophical underpinnings of balancing decisions in constitutional law derive 
from the claim that the constitution embodies principles, and not rules with all-or-nothing char-
acter.  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, passim (1977). 
 99. The German lawyers talk about the principle of “practical concordance” (praktische 
Konkordanz), according to which the different constitutionally protected values need to be 
harmonized.  See Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY 
L.J. 837, 851 (1991); Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and 
American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 970. 
 100. Richard J. Goldstone, The South African Bill of Rights, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 451, 459–64 
(1997) (overview of the principles of interpreting the Bill of Rights of the South African Consti-
tution). 
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ferent methods.  One such method is moral philosophy.101  Others 
evaluate constitutional content by looking at the constitutional fram-
ers’ intent.102 Further, some advocate the use of comparative materi-
als. 
A. The Opinions of the World Community in the Jurisprudence 
Cases where comparative materials are used in normative rea-
soning abound.103  As an example, this is seen in the area of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment,” in U.S. 
constitutional analysis.  In Atkins v. Virginia, much of the court’s 
analysis relied on normative use of comparative materials, and it is 
preceded by several other cases employing normative analyses.  In 
Trop v. Dulles, one of the arguments against denationalization as a 
punishment was that statelessness is a condition “deplored in the in-
ternational community of democracies.”104  In Rudolph v. Alabama, 
the dissenters from denial of writ of certiorari contested the permissi-
bility of the death penalty for rape, based, in part, on international 
experience.105  Finally, the Court’s decision in Coker v. Georgia, which 
 
 101. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND 
PERSPECTIVES 181–210 (2nd. ed., 2000) 
 102. Id. at 99–136. 
 103. Often, two different types of normative reasoning are identified—positive and nega-
tive.  In positive analysis, the court refers to the practice of several countries, determines that 
such practice is widespread, and argues that the court should follow this practice.  In negative 
reasoning, the court refers to the foreign practice, determines that this kind of practice is associ-
ated with unacceptable regimes, and rejects the practice as normatively unacceptable.  See 
Fontana, supra note 32, at 551.  However, there is no clear-cut difference between the two ap-
proaches.  The positive argument assumes that the unacceptable regimes do not have similar 
practice—otherwise the practice could be rejected as being widespread among those countries 
under the negative argument.  The argument would be consistent only if it could be shown that 
the practice is widespread among the acceptable regimes and non-existent among the unaccept-
able regimes.  This, of course raises a practicability issue discussed below. 
 104. 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (Warren, C.J.).  “The civilized nations of the world are in virtual 
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.  It is true that several 
countries prescribe expatriation in the event that their nationals engage in conduct in deroga-
tion of native allegiance.  Even statutes of this sort are generally applicable primarily to natural-
ized citizens.  But use of denationalization as punishment for crime is an entirely different mat-
ter.  The United Nations’ survey of the nationality laws of 84 nations of the world reveals that 
only two countries, the Philippines and Turkey, impose denationalization as a penalty for deser-
tion.  In this country the Eighth Amendment forbids that to be done.”  Id. (footnotes omitted).   
 105. 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  Justice Gold-
berg thought that the following question was worth answering: “In light of the trend both in this 
country and throughout the world against punishing rape by death, does the imposition of the 
death penalty by those States which retain it for rape violate ‘evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of [our] maturing society,’ or ‘standards of decency more or less universally 
accepted?’” Id., 889–90 (footnotes omitted). 
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held the death penalty for conviction of rape unconstitutional, di-
rectly discussed international experience in its analysis of the issue.106  
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court invalidated the death penalty 
for persons under age the age of sixteen, and again noted that a con-
trary decision would be inconsistent with the practice of many ad-
vanced democracies.107  The use of foreign experience did receive a 
blow in Stanford v. Kentucky, a death penalty case for juveniles under 
age eighteen,108 but again found support in the Atkins v. Virginia deci-
sion.109 
Atkins v. Virginia was succeeded by Patterson v. Texas,110  where 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, ar-
gued in a dissent from denial of a stay of execution that there is an 
“apparent consensus that exists among the States and in the interna-
tional community against the execution of a juvenile offender.”111 
 
 106. 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (“It is . . . not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations 
in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape where death did not 
ensue.”). 
 107. 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (footnotes omitted) (“The conclusion that it would offend civi-
lized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his 
or her offense is consistent with the views that have been expressed . . . by other nations that 
share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European 
community.”).  The case is especially interesting for the remark that “[J]uvenile executions are 
also prohibited in the Soviet Union.”  Id. at 831.  References to the practices of non-democratic 
countries may thus play a role. 
 108. 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989). 
 109. See supra notes 1–5, and accompanying text. 
 110. 536 U.S. 984 (2002).  About two months later, Justice Stevens, with whom Justice 
Souter, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer joined, dissented from denial of petition for writ of 
habeas corpus, but the six-page dissent did not refer to foreign experience at all.  See In re Stan-
ford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).  However, on the same day, Justice Breyer re-
ferred to foreign experience when dissenting from denial of certiorari in a case dealing with the 
delays in carrying out capital punishment.  Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (“Courts of other nations have found that delays of 15 years or less can render capital 
punishment degrading, shocking, or cruel. . . . Consistent with these determinations, the Su-
preme Court of Canada recently held that the potential for lengthy incarceration before execu-
tion is a ‘relevant consideration’ when determining whether extradition to the United States vio-
lates principles of ‘fundamental justice.’”).  Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence from denial of 
certiorari, condemning the use of the foreign precedents. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 111. Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The issue was decided 
by the court in favor of the constitutionality of this punishment in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 
U.S. 361 (1989).  The dissent is more remarkable because in Atkins v. Virginia Justice Stevens, 
writing for the majority, implicitly denied that Stanford v. Kentucky should be overturned.  The 
majority discussed the difference between the death penalty for mentally retarded and juveniles: 
“A comparison to Stanford v. Kentucky, in which we held that there was no national consensus 
prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders over age 15, is telling.  Although we decided 
Stanford on the same day as Penry, apparently only two state legislatures have raised the 
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Courts engaging in other areas of constitutional analysis have 
also utilized comparative analysis.  For example, the dissent by Justice 
Rehnquist in California v. Minjares, where he claimed that he felt 
“morally certain that the United States is the only nation in the world 
in which the most relevant, most competent evidence as to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused is mechanically excluded because of the 
manner in which it may have been obtained”112 implies that other na-
tions would not condemn at least some use of illegally obtained evi-
dence.  Justice Harlan argued in his Poe v. Ullmann dissent that 
criminal punishment for the use of contraceptives is unconstitutional, 
supported by the fact that other democracies take no similar meas-
ures.113  In Washington v. Glucksberg,114 foreign experience was used 
to show that suicide has been condemned by many countries,115 and 
that assisted suicide is prohibited by most.116  The Supreme Court has 
in several instances referred to the importance of free speech, arguing 
that freedom of speech is essential for democracy by referring to con-
trary practices in non-democratic countries.117  At the same time, the 
Court has justified certain limitations on free speech by referring to 
the practice of similar democratic countries.118  There are several cases 
 
threshold age for imposition of the death penalty.”  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, at 316 
(2002) (citation omitted).   
 112. 443 U.S. 916, 919 (1979) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 113. 367 U.S. 497, 554–55 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[A] diligent search has revealed that no 
nation, including several which quite evidently share Connecticut’s moral policy, has seen fit to 
effectuate that policy by the means presented here.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 114. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  In this case, empirical arguments based on foreign evidence were 
also made.  See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 115. Id. at 711 (“for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has pun-
ished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide”); Id. at 774 (Souter, J., 
concurring) (“The dominant western legal codes long condemned suicide.”). 
 116. Id. at 711 (“[A] blanket prohibition on assisted suicide . . . is the norm among western 
democracies.”  (quoting Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] D.L.R. (4th) 
342, 404 (Can.)).  The foreign experience was also discussed in the oral arguments.  See Christo-
pher McCrudden, A Part of the Main? The Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases and Comparative 
Law Methodology in the United States Supreme Court, in LAW AT THE END OF LIFE: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND ASSISTED SUICIDE 125, 134–37 (Carl E. Schneider ed., 2000). 
 117. For an extensive overview, see Fontana, supra note 32; Slaughter, supra note 39; Dam-
mann, supra note 30. 
 118. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (Scalia, J.) (“[O]ur society, like 
other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few 
limited areas.”).  This quotation seems to imply that limitations are justified, partly because the 
other countries accept them.  Of course, the citation does not answer the counterfactual—what 
if other countries would not accept such limitations? 
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where the Court has condemned the practice of some countries that 
would not serve as a good example to the United States.119 
Foreign courts and legislative bodies have also utilized foreign 
materials.  The House of Lords has rejected the right to assisted sui-
cide based on the lack of consensus among different countries.120  The 
South African Constitutional court, when limiting the use of deadly 
force for making arrests, declared that “South African law on this 
topic is brought into line with that of comparable open and democ-
ratic societies based on dignity, equality and freedom, for instance 
Tennessee v. Garner in the United States and McCann v. United 
Kingdom in Europe.”121  In a case involving the constitutionality of 
mandatory life sentences, the court noted that “there are many exam-
ples of other open and democratic societies which permit the legisla-
ture to limit the judiciary’s power to impose punishments.”122  The 
court has noted that “open and democratic societies permit reason-
able proscription of activity and expression that pose a real and sub-
stantial threat to such values and to the constitutional order itself.  
Many societies also accept limits on free speech in order to protect 
the fairness of trials.”123  In Jordan v. State, where the court decided 
that the prohibition of prostitution does not excessively infringe the 
constitutional right to economic activity or privacy, it explicitly relied 
on comparative arguments.124  Sometimes, courts admit that a single 
 
 119. For an exemplary list, see Fontana, supra note 32, at n. 275–77, and accompanying text.  
Yet, this kind of reasoning from comparative analysis could be persuasive only if the line of ar-
gument could be “turned around” by showing that the practice is characteristic to the “patho-
logical” case only, and that no other country has adopted it.   
 120. Regina (Pretty) v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [2002] 1 A.C. 800.  Lord Justice Bingham 
relied on the “very broad international consensus.”  Other justices held similar opinions. 
 121. S. v. Walters, Case CCT 28/01, ¶ 52, available at http://www.concourt.gov.za (references 
omitted). 
 122. S. v. Dodo, 2001 (3) SA 382, ¶ 27 (CC).  Thereafter, the court discussed the practice 
and case law in the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, India, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, and Namibia. 
 123. Islamic Unity Convention v. Indep. Broad. Auth., 2002 (5) BCLR 433, ¶ 29 (SA) (hold-
ing unconstitutional certain regulations of broadcasting). 
 124. Jordan v. State, 2002 (11) BCLR 1117, ¶ 56 (SA) (footnotes omitted) (“Open and de-
mocratic societies adopt a variety of different ways of responding to prostitution, including out-
right prohibition.  The European Court recently underlined the wide discretion that states have 
in relation to prostitution as an economic activity.  In the circumstances, therefore, we are satis-
fied that [criminal punishment for prostitution] constitutes a measure designed to promote or 
protect the quality of life as contemplated by [the constitution] and that it is a measure consid-
ered justifiable in open and democratic societies based on freedom and equality.  It is therefore 
not inconsistent with the right [freely to engage in economic activity].”).  In regard to privacy, 
the court held that: “open and democratic societies vary enormously in the manner in which 
they characterise and respond to prostitution.  Thus practice in such countries ranges from al-
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foreign case amounts to persuasive authority.  A justice of the Irish 
Supreme Court, for example, referred to the German experience as 
being “persuasive authority (as a comparative constitution) on fun-
damental principles of democracy and equality which, as a basic tenet, 
are common to both Constitutions.”125 
Supranational courts, such as the European Court of Justice, use 
similar ideas.126  In the very first group of cases before the court, com-
parative analysis was the basis for creating principles of Community 
law.127  The practice was continued in the Internationale Handelsge-
sellschaft case, where the court mentioned that in determining the ex-
tent of fundamental rights in the community, it was “inspired by the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States.”128  The parties to the 
cases usually refer to the practice of Member States, and opinions of 
the Advocate General often contain comparative assessments of the 
 
lowing prostitution but not brothel-keeping to allowing both; suppressing both; to setting aside 
zones for prostitution; and to licensing brothels and collecting taxes from them.  The issue is 
generally treated as one of governmental policy expressed through legislation rather than one of 
constitutional law to be determined by the courts.  We are unaware of any successful constitu-
tional challenge in domestic courts to laws prohibiting commercial sex.  The matter appears to 
have been treated as one for legislative choice, and not one for judicial determination.  The is-
sue is an inherently tangled one where autonomy, gender, commerce, social culture and law en-
forcement capacity intersect.  A multitude of differing responses and accommodations exist, and 
public opinion is fragmented and the women’s movement divided.  In short, it is precisely the 
kind of issue that is invariably left to be resolved by the democratically accountable law-making 
bodies.” Id. ¶ 90 (footnotes omitted). 
 125. In re Bunreacht Na hEireann; McKenna v.  Taoiseach, [1996] 1 I.L.R.M. 81, 113 (Ir.) 
(citing the Official Propaganda Case, 46 BVerfGE 125 (1977)). 
 126. KIIKERI, supra note 24, at 99–152; McCrudden, supra note 26 at 522–23; J.H.H. Weiler 
& Nicholas J.S. Lockhart, “Taking Rights Seriously” Seriously: The European Court and its 
Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 51 (1995); C.N. Kakouris, Use of 
the Comparative Method by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 6 PACE INT’L L. 
REV. 267 (1994). 
 127. Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice, 20 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 656, 663 (1997). 
 128. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle Getreide, 
1970 E.C.R. 1125. 
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legal situation in the Member States,129 although the Court itself nor-
mally refrains from express citations to foreign cases and laws.130 
Commonalities between countries, such as a common history or 
constitutional approach, have also been used as the basis of norma-
tive reasoning through reference to foreign materials.131  The most ob-
vious example of “genealogical,” or historical commonality reasoning, 
is the jurisprudence by the Commonwealth courts.  For example, the 
Australian,132 Canadian,133 and Pakistani134 courts have long held ex-
amples from English law to be persuasive, as did the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the beginning of its existence.  The main reason for this is 
the shared heritage of common law.  Similarly, in Knight v. Florida, 
Justice Breyer argued for review of a  case involving the execution of 
death row inmates after long delays (nineteen and twenty-five years), 
arguing that the Court “has long considered as relevant and informa-
tive the way in which foreign courts have applied standards roughly 
comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly compara-
ble circumstances.  In doing so, the Court has found particularly in-
structive opinions of former Commonwealth nations insofar as those 
opinions reflect a legal tradition that also underlies our own Eighth 
Amendment.”135  However, Justice Breyer viewed these precedents as 
 
 129. Case C-353/99 P, Council of the European Union v. Hautala, Opinion of the Advocate 
General Léger, ¶ 56 (footnotes omitted) (concerning access to E.U. documents and analyzing 
the practices of Member States).  “According to consistent caselaw now enshrined in the Trea-
ties, fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law with which the 
Court of Justice ensures compliance.  To that end, it draws on the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States and on evidence provided by international instruments concern-
ing protection of human rights in which Member States have cooperated or to which they have 
acceded.” 
 130. Kakouris, supra note 126, at 276 (“As a rule, the Court does not make detailed refer-
ence to any comparative examination which preceded its judgment . . . . Not only is there usually 
no detailed reference, but there is no reference at all.”). 
 131. See Pradyumna K. Tripathi, Foreign Precedents and Constitutional Law, 57 COLUM. L. 
REV. 319, 323 (1957) (arguing that historical association between different courts has primary 
importance in explaining the persuasiveness of foreign precedents). 
 132. See Jianfu Chen, The Use of Comparative Law by Courts: Australian Courts at the 
Crossroads, in THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS 25 (Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef van Erp 
eds., 1999). 
 133. H. Patrick Glenn, The Use of Comparative Law by Common Law Courts in Canada, in 
THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS 59 (Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef van Erp eds., 1999). 
 134. Tayyab Mahmud, Freedom of Religion and Religious Minorities in Pakistan: A Study of 
Judicial Practice, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 40, 47 n.17 (1995) (“Pakistan’s judiciary, like that of 
other post-colonial common law jurisdictions, treats case law and other authoritative texts from 
other common law jurisdictions as strong persuasive authority.  Pakistan’s constitutional cases 
are rife with citations to Indian, American and English cases and treatises.”). 
 135. 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
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“useful even though not binding,”136 though he did not delineate the 
features of that “usefulness.” 
These positive examples of applying foreign experience in nor-
mative reasoning are by no means conclusive evidence that courts un-
equivocally do, or should, accept the use of international standards or 
the practice of courts in similarly situated countries.  The dissenters in 
Atkins v. Virginia have made it clear that the use of foreign materials 
continues to be viewed as illegitimate by some.137 
B. The Legitimacy and Weight of Comparative Normative Reason-
ing 
There are two basic arguments against courts drawing normative 
conclusions based on foreign experience.  The first of them is a gen-
eral argument against normative reasoning and balancing as such and 
warrants no thorough discussion here.138  The second argument, based 
on the democratic basis of judicial decision-making, is directed 
against comparative reasoning and warrants closer inspection. 
1. The World Community and the Democratic Nature of Judi-
cial Decision-Making. The democratic basis argument is concerned 
with the fact that courts are part of a national constitutional system, 
and thus exercise public power.  Only the views and the values of the 
people living in the particular country are thus argued to be rele-
vant.139  Given vastly different cultures and values, it is argued that the 
experience of one country is hardly transferable to another system.  
This argument is concerned primarily with cultural relativism.140  Cul-
tural relativists argue that standards of justice in the Western world 
are not similar to standards in the East, going so far as to say that 
standards are not similar among the countries of the Western world—
 
 136. See id. 
 137. See supra notes 1–5. 
 138. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 97, at 1004 (“Severe problems beset balancing ap-
proaches to constitutional law.”). 
 139. See Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 1122 (1996) (“. . . we 
judges of the American democracies are servants of our peoples, sworn to apply, without fear or 
favor, the laws that those peoples deem appropriate.  We are not some international priesthood 
empowered to impose upon our free and independent citizens supra-national values that con-
tradict their own.”). 
 140. E.g., Choudhry, supra note 28, at 831.  Note that this cultural relativism argument only 
looks similar to the particularism argument when “borrowings” are refuted on practical ac-
counts.  Here, relativism is the question of legitimacy.  In particularism, the relativism is the 
question of practicability and feasibility.  This reflects what Fontana, supra note 32, at 615–18, 
describes as the difference between “cultural particularism” and “pragmatic particularism”. 
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often at times even within the same country.  A specific country may 
consider certain values much differently than others because of his-
torical141 or present concerns in the society.  The fact that many coun-
tries maintain similar values does not necessarily mean that these val-
ues will be shared by all countries, nor that such values should be 
enforced by the courts in those countries.   
Many of the challenges posed in evaluating international law 
arise when balancing different legal values.  The most common form 
of legal balancing deals with juxtaposing individual and community 
values.  Certainly, there are some guidelines in a constitution’s struc-
ture regarding its balance between individualist and communitarian 
values.  However, the most significant determinant of finding the 
right balance of legal values lies in the present society.  If the society 
supports communitarian values, the courts, in theory, should be more 
able to uphold limits on individual rights such as free speech.142  Social 
scientists have spent considerable time researching the extent to 
which countries are ‘individualist’ or ‘collectivist.’  The results of this 
research support the hypothesis that countries differ in legal values 
and that these differences are at times quite significant,143  as in where 
values of democratic and authoritarian countries are compared.  
Therefore, balancing decisions in some countries will not necessarily 
reflect the values of other countries. 
Even assuming that international opinions can contribute to the 
determination of domestic rights, one must still determine what the 
international consensus is—an exercise which raises several practical 
problems.  Is it enough if the numerical majority of all countries have 
adopted a certain position?  Or is it enough if most of the “democ-
ratic” countries have adopted a position?144  How does one determine 
what the opinion of a country is?  One could certainly argue that one 
 
 141. The German jurisprudence on freedom of speech is exemplary in this case.  See Eric 
Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the “Auschwitz”—And 
Other—“Lies”, 85 MICH. L. REV. 277 (1986) (showing how German history has influenced de-
bate over criminalizing assertions that the Holocaust never existed). 
 142. E.g., KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND 
LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 129 (1995). 
 143. For a review of the research, see Daphna Oyserman et al., Rethinking Individualism 
and Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-Analyses, 128 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 3 (2002). 
 144. See the overview of such problems surrounding the interpretation of the European 
Convention of Human Rights in François Ost, The Original Canons of Interpretation of the 
European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION VERSUS NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 283, 305 
(Mireille Delmas ed., 1992). 
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only needs to look at the laws adopted in the particular state.  If dif-
ferent legislatures adopt similar positions on a moral issue, a consen-
sus among societies would arguably be evident.145  There are addi-
tional problems with this method, however.  What if a high court has 
determined the law, overriding the opinion of the legislature?  What 
if the opinion of the legislature does not reflect the consensus within 
the state?  The opinion polls might reveal different dominant values 
within the society.  Such questions are difficult suggesting that a thor-
ough comparison often is simply not possible.146 
As mentioned in the introduction to this article, comparative 
analysis was a matter of considerable dispute in Atkins v. Virginia.  In 
Atkins, the majority found evidence that there was a consensus 
among states that executing developmentally disabled criminals con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment.  However, the finding was 
based on complex considerations: “It is not so much the number of 
these States [abolishing death penalty for mentally retarded] that is 
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”147  The dis-
senters could not agree with this analysis: 
The Court attempts to bolster its embarrassingly feeble evidence of 
“consensus” with the following: “It is not so much the number of 
these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction 
of change.”. . . But in what other direction could we possibly see 
change?  Given that 14 years ago all the death penalty statutes in-
cluded the mentally retarded, any change (except precipitate undo-
ing of what had just been done) was bound to be in the one direc-
tion the Court finds significant enough to overcome the lack of real 
consensus. . . . In any event, reliance upon “trends,” even those of 
 
 145. For instance, see the dissent by Rehnquist in Atkins v. Virginia: 
[T]he work product of legislatures and sentencing jury determinations . . . ought to be 
the sole indicators by which courts ascertain the contemporary American conceptions 
of decency for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.  They are the only objective indi-
cia of contemporary values. . . . I would take issue with the blind-faith credence [the 
Court’s decision] accords the opinion polls brought to our attention.  An extensive 
body of social science literature describes how methodological and other errors can af-
fect the reliability and validity of estimates about the opinions and attitudes of a popu-
lation derived from various sampling techniques.  Everything from variations in the 
survey methodology, such as the choice of the target population, the sampling design 
used, the questions asked, and the statistical analyses used to interpret the data can 
skew the results. 
536 U.S. 304, at 324–26. 
 146. Rudolf Bernhardt, Thoughts on the Interpretation of Human-Rights Treaties, in 
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 65, 67 (Franz Matscher & Herbert 
Petzold eds., 1990). 
 147. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304, 315. 
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much longer duration than a mere 14 years, is a perilous basis for 
constitutional adjudication. . . .148 
In fact, it is quite hard to determine what a “national consensus” 
is.  It is doubtful that there can be such a thing at all, particularly con-
sidering the difficult nature of cases involving broad principles of jus-
tice.  Even if a court decision on an issue exists, it is not guaranteed 
that the decision is accepted by the majority of the population.  In ad-
dition, there exists the fear that a decision could be based on a passing 
fad of the time and could later be overruled.149  These issues suggest 
that even if one is compelled to follow a single foreign court, deci-
phering a consistent view informing a consensus is difficult.  Employ-
ing the stare decisis principle in a single legal system is often difficult 
enough.150  Yet, several arguments are useful in addressing these le-
gitimacy and practical problems, depending on the type of normative 
reasoning used.  For the purposes of this article, our inquiry will focus 
on arguments stemming from international law, the text of the consti-
tution, and the borrowed statute doctrine. 
2. International Law as a Basis for Comparative Normative 
Reasoning. The use of international law is the principal way of legiti-
mizing normative reasoning through comparison.  This is somewhat 
surprising.  Surely, if a court does not consider itself bound by inter-
national law—either customary or treaty-based—international argu-
ments lose their force. When obligatory norms of international law 
exist, those norms carry great weight.  However, for norms that have 
not yet arisen to that level, states must determine how best to balance 
values and how to interpret broad principles of justice.151  One must 
 
 148. Id. at 344–45 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting majority) (emphasis in original) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 149. E.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]his 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions 
on Americans.”). 
 150. On the stare decisis principle, see generally D. NEIL MACCORMICK & ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS, INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1997).  On the rate of over-
turning precedent in the U.S. Supreme Court, see SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, 
STARE INDECISIS: THE ALTERATION OF PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946–1992 
(1995). 
 151. Paolo G. Carozza, Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human 
Rights: Some Reflections on the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 73 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1217, 1218–19 (1998) (“[If comparison is used to] fashion fundamentally 
new human rights claims, it could lead to the flattening of the diversity of national practices and 
cultures simply because a certain number of states have made common political decisions re-
garding contested social values.”); Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the 
Margin of Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human 
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bear in mind that international custom does not become customary 
international law merely because of general state practice—
international legal doctrine demands that the practice be “ac-
cepted.”152  Therefore, one might argue that, where no general state 
practice can be ascertained, the opinions of other countries are in fact 
irrelevant. 
Three arguments can be put forward against this assertion.  First, 
comparative analysis remains a crucial tool to ascertain whether the 
state practice component of customary international law in fact exists.  
Second, there is great utility in interpreting constitutional norms “in-
ternationally.”  Third, one must take into account the way interna-
tional law is developed. 
The first argument is based on the notion that reference to for-
eign practice is a key tool employed by courts whenever they analyze 
whether customary international law exists regarding an issue.  For 
instance, the German Constitutional Court analyzed international 
practice when it had to determine whether constitutional rules against 
double jeopardy prohibit bringing criminal charges if an earlier crimi-
nal sentence had been applied abroad.153   
The second argument for uniform application of international 
law among different countries involves policy considerations.  For ex-
ample, use of foreign practice when interpreting public policy clauses 
when resolving conflicts of laws “eliminates the parochial character of 
[a] clause and . . . tends to narrow and internationalize its applica-
tion.”154   
The third argument for uniform application deals with the devel-
opment of international law and the application of evolving interna-
tional standards.  The application of international standards is most 
clearly visible in international human rights adjudication.  The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights repeatedly refers to the state of law in 
the Member States when deciding controversial issues, thus deciding 
international disputes according to the standards common to the 
Member States.155  For example, the court has demanded recognition 
 
Rights, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 391 (2001) (arguing that the development of international law 
needs to take into account the particularities of different cultures). 
 152. See MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A 
MANUAL ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 47–55 (2nd 
ed., 1997). 
 153. BverfGE 75, 1 (15). 
 154. Drobnig, supra note 10, at 15. 
 155. KIIKERI, supra note 24, at 153–90; McCrudden, supra note 26, at 522; François Ost, The 
Original Canons of Interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN 
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of gender re-assignment of transsexuals in official government docu-
ments as part of the right to privacy based on the “clear and uncon-
tested evidence of a continuing international trend in favor not only 
of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition 
of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals.”156  Simi-
larly, in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,157 the court relied on European 
consensus in striking down laws criminalizing sodomy in Northern 
Ireland.  Further, an array of cases concerning minority rights have 
discussed the need to protect the lifestyles of minorities.  In these 
cases, the court has relied on an “emerging international consensus 
amongst the Contracting States of the Council of Europe recognizing 
the special needs of minorities and an obligation to protect their secu-
rity, identity and lifestyle. . . .”158 
In contrast, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is not as 
eager to analyze the human rights standards of the parties to the 
American Convention of Human Rights, but this might be caused by 
the fact that it mostly deals with gross human rights violations where 
reference to such norms is simply unnecessary.159 
When national courts cite international human rights cases in de-
termining the content of domestic civil rights,160 the use of compara-
tive experience by the cited international human rights court indi-
 
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 
VERSUS NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 283, 305–09 (Mireille Delmas ed., 1992) (giving an overview 
of the cases utilizing this approach). 
 156. Goodwin v. U. K., 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996), at ¶ 85. 
 157. Dudgeon v. U. K., 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981). 
 158. Lee v. U.K., application no. 25289/94,  ¶ 95, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ 
Eng/Judgments.htm.  However, the consensus is not “sufficiently concrete” in order to create 
standards for particular situations. Id. ¶ 96. 
 159. David Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American Achievement, 
in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 11–12 (David Harris & Stephen Liv-
ingstone eds., 1998). 
 160. The European Court of Human Rights has had a significant impact  on the domestic 
adjudication in Member States.  See Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Principal 
Characteristics of the New ECHR Control Mechanism, as Established by Protocol No. 11, Signed 
on 11 May 1994, 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 81 (1994) (reviewing the influence in Austria, Belgium, 
Netherlands and Ireland).  After the enactment of the Human Rights Act, the courts in the 
United Kingdom are forced to apply not only the provisions of the European Convention of 
Human Rights as transposed into the British law, but they need to interpret those provisions in 
the light of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.  Human Rights Act, 
1998, c.XXX § 2(1)(a) (Eng.) (“A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in 
connection with a Convention right must take into account any judgment, decision, declaration 
or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights.”).  See generally Michael Supper-
stone &  Jason Coppel, Judicial Review after the Human Rights Act, 4 EUR. H.R. L. REV. 301 
(1999). 
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rectly impacts the jurisprudence of domestic courts.  In these cases, 
domestic courts follow the lead of other countries, brokered by the 
international human rights court.161 
3. Constitutional Text. In some cases, a country’s constitution 
directs national courts to take into account foreign experience.  Ar-
guably, the most famous provision directing this type of analysis is 
contained in the South African Constitution, stating that the courts 
“may consider foreign law.”162 
Some courts use more implicit constitutional provisions to justify 
utilizing foreign materials.  For instance, a constitution contains may 
limit the inquiry standards found in democratic societies.163  The 
European Convention on Human Rights contains similar clauses in 
Articles 8 through 11, allowing for restrictions to convention rights 
only if the restrictions are “necessary in a democratic society.”  This 
clause has warranted inter-state comparisons to determine the per-
missibility of such restrictions.  However, the interpretation of supra-
national clauses by the European Court of Human Rights shows that 
using international consensus as a human rights standard is problem-
atic also of the wide latitude left to individual states. Namely, the ju-
risprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has often al-
lowed states a wide “margin of appreciation” to determine what is 
really necessary for democracy in a particular state.164  Occasionally, 
 
 161. The similar approach has been taken in other types of litigation, for example in trans-
national commercial litigation.  This is even the case where no international dispute settlement 
body exists, including such treaties as the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods.  In such cases, the need for uniform interpretation of the treaty mandates the court to 
compare foreign judgments.  See the decision of the House of Lords in Fothergill v. Monarch 
Airlines Ltd., [1981] A.C. 251, 293 (H.L. 1980) (L.J. Scarman) (“Our courts will have to develop 
their jurisprudence in company with the courts of other countries. . . .”).  Drobnig, supra note 
10, at 8–9 (arguing for the uniform interpretation of the convention). 
 162. Section 39 provides: “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dig-
nity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign 
law.” S. AFR. CONST. § 39 (1996). 
 163. E.g., according to the Article 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 
charter “guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”  CAN. 
CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 1.   
 164. See generally HOWARD C. YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN 
THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996) (discussing the doc-
trine of margin of appreciation); Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-
Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES 
ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 240 (1996) (discussing the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights). 
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the court attempts to determine what is necessary through an exami-
nation of standards adopted by the signatories to a particular treaty.  
This approach is troubling because the commonality of standards be-
tween the states does not necessarily tell us when we should appreci-
ate a divergence from these standards in a particular country.165  Simi-
larly, a domestic constitutional provision calling for adopting a 
standard necessary in a democratic society has to take into account 
that different societies have different values and different necessities.  
It is the duty of the court to appreciate these differences. 
The preceding discussion has shown that international law, fed-
eral law, and the text of the constitution can legitimize the use of in-
ternational standards.  However, it must be borne in mind that not all 
courts are part of a federal system or have to apply international 
norms themselves, and that not all constitutions contain general 
clauses directing courts to look at international standards.  Moreover, 
it may actually be the duty of the court not to succumb to interna-
tional pressures and thereby preserve the particular culture of the so-
ciety in which it operates.  Further, the legitimacy of applying interna-
tional standards does not eliminate the practical problems of 
determining what the international standards actually are.  This prob-
lem must be kept in mind when determining the content of broad 
constitutional principles or making balancing decisions. 
4. The Borrowed Statute Doctrine. The final argument for the 
legitimacy of comparative normative reasoning relies on the bor-
rowed statute doctrine—when a statute or constitution has foreign 
origins, a court may feel especially compelled to follow foreign inter-
pretation of that statute or constitution.166  In such cases, the courts 
are not bound by a broad, difficult-to-establish “international consen-
sus,” but rather by a more limited set of cases.  Thus, a court would 
look to the “parent” constitution and its interpretation in resolving 
constitutional problems.  The very fact that a constitutional provision 
has been borrowed, or that the legal system more generally has roots 
in a foreign system, makes the courts in this other system an author-
 
 165. Carozza, supra note 151, at 1233 (“[I]nter-state comparison will not itself give us the 
reasons to choose in any instance whether to affirm a uniform international standard of human 
rights or whether to allow the play of difference and discretion among states.”). 
 166. In Germany, see Ulrich Drobnig, The Use of Foreign Law by German Courts, in THE 
USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS 127, 134–35 (Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef van Erp, eds., 
1999) (discussing cases where the German Federal Supreme Court has referred to Swiss and 
Austrian practice because the rules they applied were inspired by the Swiss and Austrian rules). 
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ity.  Choudhry167 and Fontana168 call this “genealogical” interpretation.  
Dammann justifies use of the borrowed statute approach as a result 
of its unique ability to incorporate the intentions of the drafters of the 
constitution or the statute in question, thus arguably making it a type 
of ‘intentionalist’ comparison.169  Yet, the borrowed statute approach 
may suffer from its inability to effectively take into consideration the 
unique values and conditions of the borrowing state.  While it is a use-
ful that may provide great interpretive assistance, it may not possess 
enough legitimacy to be extensively relied upon in interpreting do-
mestic laws. 
C. Conclusion 
It appears that the use of comparative experience when defining 
broad constitutional categories or balancing conflicting values is 
rather limited.  Each country has its own unique values and, unless 
binding international obligations exist, domestic courts should not 
import foreign values.  Moreover, foreign values are often difficult to 
determine.  Instead of applying a rigid method to determine the “av-
erage” or “dominant” foreign values, courts should look at the values 
of its own society.   
VII.  THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN EMPIRICAL 
ARGUMENT 
A. Comparison and Prediction 
Balancing decisions in constitutional jurisprudence not only in-
volve normative issues, but also involve empirical questions.  One of 
the basic tenets of proportionality analysis is to ask whether the chal-
lenged measure in fact pursues the aim that has been brought forward 
to justify the measure.  In order to determine this, a prediction has to 
be made.170  Use of comparative experience in creating empirical ar-
guments171 thus seems logical.  In fact, how else can one find empirical 
evidence that an interpretation is valid?  Governments and courts are 
 
 167. Choudhry, supra note 28, at 866–85. 
 168. Fontana, supra note 32, at 550. 
 169. Dammann, supra note 30, at 520–21. 
 170. See generally, David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring 
the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991) (dis-
cussing normative constitutional analysis and the role of judicial fact-finding in constitutional 
theory). 
 171. See generally Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1238–69. 
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not equipped with laboratories where they could have two “experi-
ments” run at the same time, with different interpretations of the law.  
Similarly, as the states in a federal system might serve as laborato-
ries,172 foreign countries could serve as laboratories in the world com-
munity. 
In Printz v. U.S., Justice Breyer argued that the court should 
look at the experience of the European federal systems in order to 
determine whether it is dangerous to assign the States enforcement 
powers under federal laws.173  In Washington v. Glucksberg, the ex-
perience of the Netherlands was discussed thoroughly.174  In Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, Justice Breyer referred to the British and French 
experience of regulating religious schools.175  However, this type of 
comparative analysis is not extensive and foreign courts appear to 
make such inferences with even less frequency than the U.S. Supreme 
Court.176 
 
 172. See generally DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 85–88 (1995) (for an 
overview of the issues); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 397–400 
(1997) (discussing innovation in a federal system). 
 173. Breyer argued: 
At least some other countries, facing the same basic problem, have found that local 
control is better maintained through application of a principle that is the direct oppo-
site of the principle the majority derives from the silence of our Constitution.  The fed-
eral systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, for example, all pro-
vide that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many 
of the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the central “federal” body.  They 
do so in part because they believe that such a system interferes less, not more, with the 
independent authority of the “state,” member nation, or other subsidiary government, 
and helps to safeguard individual liberty as well. 
521 U.S. 898, 976–77 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 174.  
This concern [that permitting assisted suicide will start it down the path to voluntary 
and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia] is further supported by evidence about the 
practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands. . . . [The Dutch government’s own study] 
suggests that, despite the existence of various reporting procedures, euthanasia in the 
Netherlands has not been limited to competent, terminally ill adults who are enduring 
physical suffering, and that regulation of the practice may not have prevented abuses 
in cases involving vulnerable persons, including severely disabled neonates and elderly 
persons suffering from dementia. . . . There is . . . a substantial dispute today about 
what the Dutch experience shows.  Some commentators marshal evidence that the 
Dutch guidelines have in practice failed to protect patients from involuntary euthana-
sia and have been violated with impunity. . . . This evidence is contested. 
521 U.S. 702, 734–35 (1997). 
 175. 536 U.S. 639, 725 (2002). 
 176. McCrudden, supra note 26, at 526 (“This approach appears to be much less frequent in 
courts outside the U.S.A..”); McCrudden, supra note 116, at 145 (concluding that the U.S. court 
relies on empirical evidence from abroad more regarding how a law operates in practice even 
though U.S. courts are generally “remarkably insular” in their approach to what amounts to 
persuasive legal authority). 
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B. The Legitimacy and Weight of ‘Empirical Use’ 
There is one fundamental objection to the use of comparative 
experience in constitutional empirical argument, which relies on the 
rejection of empirical arguments across the board.  Thus, some au-
thors reject the use of empirical arguments of any type, arguing that 
these kinds of arguments cannot solve constitutional questions.177  
However, the objection is weak, as courts do in fact rely on empirical 
predictions.   
1. The Practical Problems of Comparison. The weight and le-
gitimacy of comparative reasoning depends on successfully solving 
practical problems by drawing inferences from comparative empirical 
analysis.  Whereas the legitimacy of comparative reasoning for em-
pirical purposes raises few questions, there is much less agreement on 
whether comparative reasoning can in fact produce a sound basis for 
decision-making.  Some are optimistic, but many are cautious.178  
There are several reasons for this. 
First, courts often use economic and social data in making em-
pirical arguments, as opposed to statutes or cases.  Courts are often 
not equipped with the skills necessary to deal with this kind of data.  
Arguably, empirical analysis, or “constitutional fact-finding,” has not 
been the strongest skill of the U.S. Supreme Court.179 
Second, experience from one country might shed minimal light 
on its possible consequences in another country.  This argument is 
usually brought forward by opponents of transplanting legal theories 
from one country to another.180  Legal transplants might not work 
when there are significant differences between the “donor” and “re-
cipient” countries.  Political differences between countries are a great 
impediment to such transplants because differences in the form of 
 
 177. See e.g., Matthew A. Edwards, Posner’s Pragmatism and Payton Home Arrests, 77 
WASH. L. REV. 299, 328–33 (2002) (providing an overview of the controversy). 
 178. E.g., Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1269 (“[W]e might properly be rather skeptical about 
what we can truly learn when we think about constitutional experience elsewhere in functional-
ist terms.”). 
 179. See generally Donald N. Bersoff & David J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The Supreme 
Court’s Continuing Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 279 
(1995) (providing a critical overview of the Supreme Court). 
 180. See generally Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. 
L. REV. 1 (1974) (discussing uses and misuses of foreign law in the process of law making); Wil-
liam Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 489 (1995) (discussing the transplantation of legal rules and arguing for reforms in compara-
tive law).  For a prominent support of legal transplants, see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL 
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2nd. ed. 1993).   
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government or the prominence of interest groups may be significant.  
Further, complex relationships between different institutions compli-
cate the transferability of a singular or small portion of the legal sys-
tem from one country to another181—“[P]articular institutions serve 
complex functions in each constitutional system, and there is little 
reason to think that directly appropriating an institution that func-
tions well in one system will produce the same beneficial effects when 
it is inserted into another.”182  Essentially, the notion is that the per-
formance of a certain legal institution in one country cannot be ascer-
tained based on its performance in another. 
Such deficiencies are alleviated by the insights that comparative 
political research has given, particularly the methodological advances 
of social sciences in comparative research.  However, despite these 
advances, obstacles to gaining significant and meaningful empirical 
evidence remain. 
2. Comparative Politics and Empirical Inferences. Drawing in-
ferences from social and economic data is the basis for empirically 
oriented social sciences.  A considerable amount of literature dealing 
with the methodology of drawing such inferences has been developed 
by social science research.  Courts usually draw inferences from for-
eign experience in two ways—either by making references to a single 
foreign case,183 or by utilizing several cases to ascertain trends and de-
velopments.184 
The most obvious advantage of case studies185 is that they enable 
a court to analyze the experience of another country in detail.  Thus, 
when referring to foreign experience, the court is essentially conclud-
ing that similar outcomes would be expected at home.  This conclu-
sion is based on the assumption that there is a causal linkage between 
rules and outcomes and that this causal linkage also exists in the dif-
 
 181. See generally Kahn-Freund, supra note 180 (discussing the conditions that must be 
fulfilled in order for those preparaing legislation to avail themselves of rules or institutions 
developed in foregin countries.) 
 182. Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1307. 
 183. E.g., Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 786 (replying on the experience of the Nether-
lands). 
 184. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Justice Breyer, relying on British and 
French experience).  One of the briefs relied on the experience of Netherlands, Australia, and 
United Kingdom, see infra note 188. 
 185. On the usefulness and methodology of case studies in comparative politics, see B. GUY 
PETERS, COMPARATIVE POLITICS: THEORY AND METHODS 137–55 (1998); GARY KING, 
ROBERT KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE 
IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 211 (1994). 
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ferent system, possibly even under different circumstances.  Both of 
these assumptions are heavily contested in evaluating the usefulness 
of case studies. 
The first assumption, that a causal link between rules and out-
comes exists, presupposes that it is relatively easy to identify the con-
sequences of adopting a rule.  We could thus easily determine that 
what followed was caused by the rule, rather than merely being a co-
incidental byproduct of the rule.  The critique to this assumption 
points to the fact that there is no certain way to establish the causal 
linkage between adoption of a rule and subsequent consequences.  
Any number of variables might actually have caused the observed 
outcome, not just the adoption of the rule.  The experience is thus 
hard to generalize to a wider array of cases.186  For example, a recogni-
tion of multi-variable causation was seen in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, where the court noted that a long period without serious reli-
gious strife, such as experienced in Great Britain and in France, may 
be a consequence of a number of factors.  Religious financing of 
schools may in fact have had nothing to do with this.  Rather, other 
factors might have had such a strong influence on the relationships of 
the different religious groups that the financing of religious schools 
did not cause major upheavals. 
Thus, relying on the experience of a single country or a small 
number of countries arguably raises the specter that arguments de-
veloped will be anecdotal.  There is a danger that such constitutional 
comparative legal analysis would devolve into a contest of determin-
ing who can produce a better anecdote.  This “battle of anecdotes” 
should not be viewed as a permissible legal strategy.  For example, 
the deterrent effect of the death penalty cannot be dispositively 
proven by comparing crime rates in a death penalty state to rates in 
another state where the death penalty has been abolished.  
For social scientists, selecting only those cases that support an 
argument, or selecting cases because they support an argument, is one 
of the basic violations of the rules of empirical inference.187  Zelman, 
the school voucher case, is a good example of this error.  The dissent-
ers in Zelman relied on the experience of France, Great Britain, and 
the countries in the Balkans, where they found evidence that religious 
schools might have harmful effects.  The dissenters never discussed 
 
 186. Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1265–67. 
 187. Epstein & King, supra note 11, 112–14 
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contrary foreign experience, as extensively discussed in the respon-
dent’s brief.188 
Case studies, when supported by sound theory, can assist in legal 
analysis, however, case studies by themselves do not warrant general-
ized legal conclusions.189  Case studies at best offer tentative hypothe-
ses that must be tested before any generalized conclusions can be 
made.190  An anecdote may assist in refuting absolute claims, by refer-
ring to positive experience from other countries.  This does not mean, 
however, that the foreign solution is necessarily reasonable or accept-
able in the domestic context. 
In addition to case studies, there is utility in relying on compari-
sons involving just a few countries as well as more in-depth, statistical 
studies involving a large number of countries.  In the first instance, 
comparisons usually rely on evidence from countries selected con-
sciously for the analysis.  The “most similar systems design” method is 
based on the assumption that if two “otherwise similar” countries 
adopt different institutions or legal rules on one issue and obtain dif-
ferent outcomes, the difference in these outcomes is most probably 
explained by the difference in the institution or the rule.191  The basic 
argument in support of legal transplants is similar—any difference in 
outcomes between two countries must be caused by different legal 
rules, as the other variables are held constant.192  Such comparisons 
suffer from similar deficiencies as case studies, simply because of the 
differences among countries. 
Statistical studies involving a large number of countries purport-
edly compensate for the impossibility of drawing general conclusions 
from case studies.  The statistical methods (usually multiple regres-
 
 188. Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of the Assoc. of Christian Schs. et al., Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779), available at 2001 WL 
1699133 (discussing the experience of foreign countries, especially Netherlands, England and 
Australia).  In fact, the discussion by Justice Breyer suggests the other practical problem with 
drawing empirical conclusions—that of comparability and transferability of the conclusions.  He 
admits that the British and French experience might not be very significant because these coun-
tries are religiously more homogeneous than the United States. 
 189. But see Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1267 (“Inferences from small numbers are possible, 
however, if they are supplemented by a theoretical account that provides reasons for thinking 
that particular cases exemplify more general social tendencies.”). 
 190. KING ET AL., supra note 185, at 210–11. 
 191. ADAM PRZEWORSKI & HENRY TEUNE, THE LOGIC OF COMPARATIVE SOCIAL 
INQUIRY 39 (1970). 
 192. Fontana, supra note 32, at 560 (“[T]he more similar to the United States the legal issue, 
legal system, legal history, and social situation that the other country faces, the more desirable 
the use of refined comparativism becomes.”). 
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sion analyses) attempt to find relationships when controlling for the 
variation in other variables.  The use of statistical methods in judicial 
decision-making seems limited, though, as such studies establish gen-
eral trends that might not apply in specific cases.  
These methodological problems suggest that conclusive evidence 
is almost never found through comparative analysis.193  When courts 
base their decisions on inconclusive evidence, the results are neither 
beneficial to comparative law nor legal analysis.  Some empirical in-
ferences are clearly reasonable.   
Many major issues in comparative politics are still open to argu-
ment.  Thus, even the use of expert witnesses in the courtroom to ex-
plain and support the transferability of foreign law194 to the domestic 
context helps little.  Meaningful comparative studies take time, and 
the results of such studies would be far from conclusive evidence for 
judges.   
C. Conclusion 
The use of comparative experience to make empirical predictions 
is theoretically a cure for many ills of legal reasoning.  However, its 
“wrong” use can be as harmful as the misapplication of any social sci-
ence data.  The “right” use of comparative experience, however, is 
enormously difficult to achieve.  Even when accomplished, there are 
few clear-cut conclusions to be drawn from its application.  The prac-
tical hopes for finding help from comparative analysis are thus mod-
est. 
The benefits of comparative empirical reasoning, however, ap-
pear to be greatest when foreign experience is taken from a very simi-
lar country or system, as is the case in comparative normative analy-
sis.  When using similar countries, comparative empirical reasoning 
benefits from the “most similar systems design,” whereas comparative 
normative analysis benefits from federal or international “broker-
age.” Comparative experience can serve as a persuasive authority in 
 
 193. Jennifer Widner, Comparative Politics and Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 739, 
744–45 (1998) (suggesting that comparative research entails tradeoffs between accuracy, gener-
ality, and parsimony). 
 194. Fontana, supra note 32, at 556 (“a judge should encourage litigants to argue compara-
tive constitutional law to courts . . . sometimes even using expert witnesses on foreign law who 
can help the judge determine the relevant comparative constitutional law and its transferabil-
ity”); “If the court is concerned about contextual differences and how a comparative rule would 
work in the American context, the court may appoint someone trained to study differing institu-
tional contexts who may look at sources beyond written constitutional, statutory, and decisional 
law to determine how the law has actually worked in another country.” Id. at 564 
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legal decision-making when utilized to compare the experiences of 
similar countries. 
VIII.  THE STRATEGY OF COMPARATIVE REASONING 
Thus far, this article has discussed the role of comparative analy-
sis in reaching conclusions in a legal argument and it is suggested that 
the reasons for inserting comparative elements into judicial opinions 
may be strategic.  I will now turn more closely to the issue of strategic 
considerations and discuss the circumstances where one can expect to 
find such strategically-based comparative references.  The following is 
a positive analysis.  Its goal is not to persuade or justify comparative 
references, but to explain them.  The question at hand is to determine 
why some courts utilize comparative analysis more than others.195 
A. Comparative Reasoning as an Element of Judicial Strategy 
The search for explanations regarding comparative reasoning 
must begin with analyzing the motivation of the relevant actors—the 
judges or the court in general.  This is a field that has drawn consider-
able attention from scholars from both political science196 and the 
law.197  Based on the motivation of judges, specific models can be set 
up.  This can be done on two levels—individual and institutional. 
B. Institutional Motivation to Engage in Comparative Reasoning 
Institutional analysis evaluates the court as a unitary actor and 
deals with the goals of the court as a single institution.  Institutional 
predictions look at the strategic behavior of the court, hypothesizing 
that the court wants to persuade its audience.198  One prominent pre-
dictive model is based on separation-of-powers considerations, which 
hypothesize that the court wants to make policy that will not be over-
turned by subsequent executive or legislative action.199  In applying 
 
 195. There are some attempts to explain this.  See Tripathi, supra note 131, at 344–45; 
McCrudden, supra note 26, at 516–27. 
 196. E.g., Lawrence Baum, What Judges Want: Judges’ Goals and Judicial Behavior, 47 POL. 
RES. Q. 749 (1994). 
 197. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 117–23 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, 
The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. 
REV. 827, 832–44. 
 198. E.g., McCormick, supra note 25 at 528–29 (1997) (“[A] case is cited because it contrib-
utes to convincing the relevant audience (which includes, but is by no means limited to, the im-
mediate parties) of the appropriateness of the outcome.”). 
 199. The literature on this model is abundant.  Besides political scientists, several legal 
scholars have engaged in this kind of analysis.  See generally Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation of 
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this predictive model to a court’s use of comparative reasoning, one 
would also predict that courts use comparative arguments in order to 
persuade other branches of government that the court’s analysis is 
sound.   
Relatively young constitutional courts, rather than established 
regimes, may find particular use for comparative experience based on 
the need to seek judicial legitimacy by referring to more experienced 
constitutional courts.  For instance, young constitutional courts can 
justify entering certain areas of policymaking by referring to other 
courts which have acted similarly.200  In addition, these courts can per-
suade other governmental bodies that their judgment is substantively 
in line with the practice of other democratic countries.201  This might 
be especially true for courts in countries undergoing political transi-
tion, in order to show the way for democratic development.  Further, 
demonstrating that courts throughout the world have dealt with a par-
ticular question might help prevent accusations that the court is inter-
fering with political questions more appropriately addressed by other 
branches of government. 
This discussion pertains only to the legitimacy of the court, which 
is important for how its decisions will be perceived by other actors 
and institutions in the domestic complex, and not necessarily for mak-
ing the legal argument better in and of itself.  Moreover, for some 
courts referring to foreign case law might diminish the legitimacy of a 
holding, rather than enhance it.202  Indeed, people may view borrow-
 
Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (1997) 
(comparing models of voting behavior by Supreme Court justices); William N. Eskridge Jr., Re-
neging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 
613 (1991) (evaluating Supreme Court statutory interpretation, specifically in the civil rights 
context); Cornell W. Clayton, The Supply and Demand Sides of Judicial Policy-Making (Or, 
Why Be So Positive About the Judicialization of Politics?), 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 
(2002) (evaluating John Ferejohn’s arguments on the judicialization of politics.) 
 200. For instance, on Zimbabwe, see Lovemore Madhuku, The Impact of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Africa: The Zimbabwean Experience, 8 AFR. J. INT’L. & COMP. L.  
932, 943 (1996) (“[R]eferences to comparative international cases is a part of a well designed 
judicial policy of activism.  Judges do not want to be seen to be openly making law. . . . [T]he  
ECHR has been a great help.”). 
 201. Slaughter, supra note 39, at 116 (“[B]y pointing to the actions of fellow states, a na-
tional court can reassure itself (and its government) that it will not disadvantage the nation in 
dealing with other nations.  On the other hand, an advocate arguing before such a court can 
urge the government to get in line with fellow governments, suggesting the possibility of exclu-
sion if a government remains a hold-out.”). 
 202. This seems to be the case with the U.S. Supreme Court.  Even courts that use compara-
tive case law often make the point that they do not apply foreign law, but just get ideas from it.  
See supra notes  70–75 and accompanying text. 
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ing ideas from foreign decisions as surrendering to “legal imperial-
ism.”203  The courts in more powerful countries might be less enthusi-
astic about incorporating comparative analyses than courts in less 
powerful countries, as powerful political organs would normally not 
consider the country bound by the opinions and attitudes of other 
countries.  For example, this might explain why the U.S. Supreme 
Court does not readily use foreign experience.204  The fact that the 
Court has remained on the sidelines in what has become a growing in-
ternational dialogue may be troubling,205 but is an unfortunate result 
of strategic calculations.  The desire to maintain legitimacy in the eyes 
of the domestic constituency might also explain the fact that courts in 
liberal democracies cite precedent from liberal systems only, to the 
exclusion of authoritarian regimes.206 
Another reason why the courts are motivated to cite foreign 
precedents is that the court identifies itself with other courts around 
the world.  By engaging in comparative analysis, the court may be 
seen as a part of an “international community” of higher courts.  For 
instance, the American courts could exert influence on foreign judi-
cial practices207 and spread the American way of thinking and legal 
reasoning, announcing the American “constitutional gospel.”208  One 
of the reasons that the U.S. Supreme Court has not been cited by for-
 
 203. JAMES A. GARDINER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID 
TO LATIN AMERICA (1980) (on the United States’ assistance to South America). 
 204. Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism and Human Rights, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 392 (L. Henkin & 
A..J. Rosenthal eds., 1990) (“International influence on U.S. constitutional rights can only be 
recent, is smaller, and is less likely to be recognized.  To some extent there is an unwillingness 
by Americans to admit such influence: that we should be governed by ideas from foreign 
sources is not congenial to us.”); McCrudden, supra note 26, at 519–20. 
 205. Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. Rev. 
537, 561 (1988) (finding the apparent reluctance of the U.S. Supreme Court to consider overseas 
interpretations of its own cases “troubling”); L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 39, at 40 (“It is to be 
hoped . . . that the United States Supreme Court will begin to consider, in more depth, the opin-
ions of other high courts around the world.”). 
 206. McCrudden, supra note 26, at 517–18. 
 207. Justice Stevens has explicitly argued this in a dissent: “The Court of Appeal of South 
Africa—indeed, I suspect most courts throughout the civilized world—will be deeply disturbed 
by the ‘monstrous’ decision the Court announces today.”  United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 
504 U.S. 655, 687 (1992). 
 208. Fontana, supra note 32, at 571–72. (“If American constitutionalists are convicned that 
they have the right answer, one way to spread this constitutional gospel is through a respectful 
analysis of the decisions of other constitutional courts around the world.”)  Again, whether this 
is the proper role of the court and the proper source of legitimacy is not clear. 
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eign courts as often as it has in the past is arguably because of its hesi-
tancy to engage in international discussions.209   
C. Individual Motivation to Engage in Comparative Reasoning 
Another perspective on comparative reasoning offered by politi-
cal science models focuses on the attitudes and goals of individual jus-
tices.  This approach is based on the fact that a court, as such, cannot 
have preferences and opinions—courts always reflect the preferences 
and opinions of the individual justices sitting on the bench.  There is 
little controversy among political scientists that justices seek to influ-
ence legal policy.  Political scientists do differ on their theories of how 
justices behave in order to achieve their policy objectives.  The attitu-
dinal model suggests that justices vote their sincere preferences.210  
According to rational choice models, judges are constrained by both 
internal and external factors.  Internally, they need to accommodate 
and bargain in order to gain support from the other justices.  Exter-
nally, they need to consider interaction between different branches. 
Applying these notions to comparative constitutional analysis, 
we may posit the following hypotheses: attitudinalists would predict 
that judges use a comparative constitutional law argument whenever 
it supports their position.211  Under a rational choice model, however, 
a judge would not use comparative arguments so readily, but would 
first consider how these arguments might be perceived by the other 
institutions as well as by other judges.  We know that three of the jus-
tices currently on the U.S. Supreme Court, namely Rehnquist,212 
Scalia,213 and Thomas,214 have openly declared that they generally do 
not consider comparative analysis appropriate in legal analysis.  
Given these declarations, if the remaining Supreme Court justices de-
sire to have an impact on their peer justices’ votes, they should 
probably avoid the use of comparative arguments.   
 
 209. L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 39, at 30, 37–38 (arguing that the opinions of the 
Rehnquist court, which does not often cite foreign precedents, are less often cited by foreign 
courts). 
 210. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (providing an overview of Supreme Court rationale 
for judicial policy). 
 211. In fact, almost all of the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have used comparative 
constitutional law arguments. See Fontana, supra note 32, at 545–48 for the overview. 
 212. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 2252–54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 213. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 2264 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 214. Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002). 
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D. A Role for Law in Comparative Constitutional Reasoning 
The individual and institutional approaches described above 
seem to neglect the position of law in judicial decision-making.  
Should we not expect to find comparative arguments in those cases 
when reference to foreign opinions makes the legal argument better?  
At the very least, the foreign experience might offer pedagogical 
guidance in finding good legal arguments or help the court to fill a 
vacuum that exists.  Would we not expect a court to use comparative 
reasoning at least in the early years of its jurisprudence?  After 
enough time has passed and domestic precedents suffice, the recourse 
to foreign judgments would become unnecessary.215  Smithey, using 
case law from the Canadian Supreme Court and African Constitu-
tional Court, finds evidence that judges rely on precedent because of 
its utility in cutting information costs and decreasing uncertainty.216  
Using foreign decisions might thus offer self-assurance for courts that 
they have employed a sound method of legal analysis.217  However, 
self-assurance could be achieved after consulting foreign experience, 
and it would thus be unnecessary to engage in time-consuming discus-
sions in the opinion, thereby saving the court from the possibility of 
embarrassing itself and the public by misunderstanding an area of 
foreign law. 
We would still expect a court to use comparative constitutional 
arguments for legal purposes, if they help to improve a legal argu-
ment.218  There are several factors that make comparative reasoning a 
 
 215. McCrudden, supra note 26, at 523–24. 
 216. Smithey, supra note 26.  See also Koopmans, supra note 24, at 545 (stating that the use 
of comparative experience is “occasioned by the lawyer’s search for fresh perspectives, in par-
ticular when completely new legal problems are to be solved”); Glenn, supra note 89, at 280 
(“The idea gains currency that the extent of borrowing of foreign authority is a simple function 
of the adequacy of local sources, and that local sources can be adequate if enough law is pro-
duced suitable to local conditions.”); Yash Ghai, Sentinels of Liberty or Sheep in Woolf’s  Cloth-
ing? Judicial Politics and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, 60 MOD. L. REV. 459, 479 (1997) (“The 
courts are willing to consider cases from foreign jurisdictions, although as some areas get ex-
plored, there is less need for them.”); Hoyt Webb, The Constitutional Court of South Africa: 
Rights Interpretation and Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 205, 281 (1998) 
(“As the Court gains experience and precedents take root, the Court’s need to canvass interna-
tional and foreign comparative jurisprudence for insights and guidance may diminish.”). 
 217. McCrudden, supra note 26, at 518 (describing a pedagogical impulse to bind countries 
to like-minded states). 
 218. Of course, no consensus as to what constitutes a perfectly legitimate argument exists.  
However, there are some lines of analysis that are universally accepted as being sources of legal 
argument, such as text, intention of the framers, precedent, and purpose of the statute.  For a 
comparative overview, see D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, Interpretation and Justi-
fication, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 511–44 (D. Neil MacCormick 
FINAL ANNUS.DOC 3/8/2005  9:44 AM 
348 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:301 
good argument in one court, but not another.  For example, different 
societies might disagree on what appropriate legal decision-making 
entails.  Whenever consensus exists that the constitution should be in-
terpreted according to original intent behind a constitutional provi-
sion, references to foreign precedent are less likely to occur than 
when judges assert that the constitution should be interpreted in light 
of the evolving societal standards.219 
The foregoing analysis shows that for some courts comparative 
arguments are more compelling than for others.  The courts in a fed-
eralist system or the courts bound by international law should use 
comparative arguments more readily than courts in a more independ-
ent system. Also, courts in similar societies and legal systems should 
be better equipped to use empirical arguments based on comparative 
analysis. 
However, the legal model cannot account for the “soft” use of 
precedent.  Citing and discussing foreign decisions does not add to a 
holding’s legal significance as a matter of precedent.  There are neces-
sarily other strategic factors which a court considers when citing for-
eign authorities.  Maximizing an argument’s persuasive power is 
largely determined by legal strategy, and not by some abstract rules of 
what counts as a good legal argument. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
The analysis has shown that the use of comparative constitu-
tional law by courts is rather limited.  Discussing foreign judgments 
may provide inspiration for judges, but citing them in the opinion 
does not make the argument itself stronger in terms of precedential 
authority.  Interpreting broad constitutional principles or balancing 
constitutional values needs to take into account the particular cultural 
and social setting of the court more than uncertain notions of “inter-
national consensus.”  Learning from the experience abroad may help 
 
& Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).  This article cannot answer the empirical question whether 
the courts actually do follow legal arguments, a claim contested by political scientists.  See e.g., 
JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED 279–311 (2002); HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR 
MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999) (ques-
tioning whether the individual justices rarely are influenced by precedent).  But  see Howard 
Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judi-
cial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465 (2001) (seeking to highlight the way behav-
ioralists approach the analysis of legal influence,  to highlight differences with the legalist ap-
proach and to suggest additional avenues for a more complete analysis). 
 219. McCrudden, supra note 26, at 524–25. 
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to conceptualize legal approaches, but foreign experience will not 
provide information about a decision’s potential domestic impact. 
Yet, the analysis of comparative constitutional reasoning has 
shown potential utility.  Empirically analyzing predictive theories on 
the use of comparative reasoning by different courts may help shed 
light on the strategy of judicial decision-making itself.  Do the 
younger constitutional courts indeed discuss foreign decisions more 
than their more experienced counterparts?  If yes, why do they do so?  
Is it because these courts want to convey to their public that they are 
interpreting law even though they have in fact entered the realm of 
politics—whatever the difference between these two disciplines may 
be?  Or do courts refer to foreign experience because they genuinely 
want to reach the best legal conclusion?  Support for the latter hy-
pothesis would certainly be an important finding for those who be-
lieve that judges are generally not over-ambitious policy-makers, but 
sincerely aiming to reach the best legal decisions. 
